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Larisa Svirsky: Responsibility and Relationship 
(Under the direction of Susan Wolf) 
Standard philosophical views of responsibility often identify responsible agency with 
capacities like rationality and self-control. Yet in ordinary life, we hold individuals responsible who 
are deficient in these capacities all the time. Consider the parent who holds her five-year-old 
responsible for not screaming in a restaurant, or the therapist who holds her patient responsible for 
arriving at appointments sober. To the extent that the existing literature has addressed these cases, it 
has suggested either that holding these individuals responsible is a form of pretense, or that these 
individuals genuinely are responsible, but to a lesser degree than paradigm responsible agents.  
I argue that neither of these approaches is satisfactory, and offer an alternative focused on 
the role relationships play in determining whether it is appropriate to hold someone responsible. For 
example, most would judge that while the parent of the five-year-old above should hold him 
responsible for screaming, the restaurant staff should not. I argue this is the case because 
relationships are sources of normative expectations about how those in the relationship should 
behave; we can be responsible in virtue of being subject to these norms. It is not only that we have 
particular responsibilities that derive from our relationships but that we are responsible agents 
because of, and for the sake of, being with other people. This is so, not only for people who are 
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“Our personhood is responsive, called into full expression by other persons who treat us as one of 
them.” – Annette Baier, “A Naturalist View of Persons.”1 
 
 Responsibility is a concept of clear importance in philosophy and in ordinary life, though it 
is also a concept that seems to resist straightforward analysis. A standard philosophical approach to 
understanding the nature of responsibility is to start with a paradigm example of a responsible agent 
and consider what is distinctive about her, in contrast to beings who are not responsible. The sort of 
agent that comes to mind is someone who is rational, self-controlled, prone to reflection, and 
sensitive to the right sorts of reasons. This approach has led philosophers to see these cognitive and 
volitional capacities as what undergirds responsible agency. It has also led them to overlook or 
condescend to agents who are impaired or immature, such as children and people with mental 
illness. Because impaired and immature agents are deficient in the capacities regarded as necessary 
for responsible agency, many philosophers have suggested either that these agents are not 
responsible, or are responsible only to a diminished degree. Indeed, they are often referred to in the 
literature as “marginal agents,” and treated as degenerate versions of the paradigm example. 
 Following P.F. Strawson’s influential article, “Freedom and Resentment,” there has been 
substantially more discussion of responsibility as a social practice, and the ways we treat those who 
we regard as responsible. But much of that discussion has centered on just two elements of 
                                                        
1 Baier (1995), pg. 314 
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Strawson’s view: first, that regarding someone as responsible inclines one to a certain range of 
emotional responses Strawson calls the reactive attitudes (of which resentment is often treated as the 
exemplar), and second, that these attitudes are responses to “the quality of others’ wills towards us, 
as manifested in their behaviour: to their good or ill will or indifference or lack of concern” 
(Strawson 15). This emphasis in the literature following Strawson has likewise led philosophers to 
treat our social practices of holding impaired and immature agents responsible as marginal. When 
compared with paradigm responsible agents, it may be unclear that young children, for example, 
really display the quality of their wills through their actions. Moreover, they are vulnerable, and we 
often do (and should) shield them from resentment, even when they act wrongly. To broaden this 
latter point, if we see holding someone responsible as equivalent to subjecting her to blame or 
punishment, it seems implausible that we ought to hold so-called marginal agents responsible. 
In sum, the responsibility literature has remarkably little to say about marginal agents, and 
what is said underestimates the extent to which these agents can be responsible. As I will argue, this 
underestimation stems from an overly narrow conception of what it means to be and to be 
appropriately held responsible. In the course of developing my positive view of responsibility, I 
emphasize two other aspects of Strawson’s project: the insistence that responsibility is a social 
notion rather than a metaphysical one, and the claim that being able to regard someone as 
responsible is part and parcel of having a close interpersonal relationship with her. 
If we see responsibility as a social practice, then theorizing about responsibility should begin 
with careful examination of how this practice plays out in ordinary life. Responsibility theorists must 
therefore explain our routinely holding impaired and immature agents responsible – in parenting, 
teaching, psychotherapy, and elsewhere. Parents hold their children responsible for not tormenting 
their siblings, and therapists hold their patients responsible for coming to their sessions as 
scheduled. This is both appropriate and perfectly ordinary, and need not involve attitudes like 
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resentment. According to standard theories of responsibility, children and people with mental illness 
are either not responsible at all or responsible to a diminished degree. As such, these theories 
suggest that either we don’t genuinely hold these agents responsible, but merely act as if we do for 
purposes of moral education, or that we hold them less than fully responsible.  
What both of these approaches fail to notice is that our relationships to particular marginal 
agents are vitally important to determining whether or not we ought to hold them responsible. For 
example, though parenting essentially involves holding one’s children responsible for their behavior, 
strangers or acquaintances are not equally entitled to hold young children responsible. In order to 
explain this feature of our responsibility practices, I argue that we must understand our relationships 
to other people as one important source of the norms we expect them to uphold. Parents create 
norms in their relationships with their children, and then have a special authority to hold their 
children to those relationship-based norms. But caregiving relationships are only part of a broader 
category of close relationships, and close relationships in general are sources of norms. The content 
of these norms, and how they are enforced, will vary across different relationships in ways that are 
responsive to the capacities and concerns of the agents in question. 
The concept of relationship-based norms allows us to understand how impaired and 
immature agents are nonetheless responsible and appropriately held responsible. On my view, to be 
responsible in some domain is to be subject to norms in that domain, and to hold someone 
responsible is to enforce (or hold her to) a norm to which she is subject. Because I argue that close 
relationships in general are sources of norms, paradigm responsible agents are likewise subject to 
relationship-based norms. This latter point allows us to appreciate a continuity between marginal 
and paradigm responsible agents, or in other words, to see that marginal agents are not so marginal 
after all.  
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Though much of my discussion here will center on marginal agents, ultimately what I will 
conclude is that responsibility is fundamentally relational. If we take this suggestion seriously, we 
ought to draw the boundaries of the responsibility community differently. The upshot is that it is not 
our rationality nor even our humanity that make us responsible, but our interest in being with 
others.  
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Holding Responsible Reconsidered 
1. Introduction 
Responsibility is a concept that is central in practical life and philosophical theorizing, but it 
seems to play a number of distinct roles in both of these contexts. Many of the ways we talk about 
responsibility seem to be in tension with each other, as well as with other views about the world and 
our place in it. One distinction that has proved helpful for untangling various judgments about 
responsibility is the distinction between being responsible and holding responsible – roughly, to be 
responsible is to satisfy whatever conditions are necessary for responsible agency; one holds 
someone responsible for an action or attitude when one holds her to account for it. In “On Being 
Responsible and Holding Responsible,” Angela Smith characterizes this distinction as follows: “…to 
say that a person is morally responsible for some thing is to say that it can be attributed to her in the 
way that is required in order for it to be a basis for moral appraisal.” In contrast, ‘holding 
responsible’ refers to “something not about the relation between an agent and her actions or 
attitudes, but about our relation to the agent and our (usually negative) assessment of her conduct” 
(Smith (2007) 467-8). 
Much of the literature about holding responsible concerns whether being responsible or 
holding responsible is prior (either explanatorily or metaphysically speaking).2 My primary focus, 
however, lies elsewhere: According to one prominent view, holding someone responsible 
necessitates its being appropriate to feel or express the negative reactive attitudes (e.g., resentment, 
                                                        
2 For a range of views on this topic, see Brink and Nelkin (2013), Smith (2007), Wallace (1994), 
Watson (2004), Shoemaker (2017), and McKenna (2012). 
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indignation) towards him. This view, while compelling, is ultimately unable to capture the full range 
of cases in which we hold others responsible in ordinary life. In this chapter, I will develop a broader 
conception of holding responsible and argue that it fares better than the view that identifies holding 
someone responsible with viewing him as an appropriate object of the negative reactive attitudes. I 
will also go on to demonstrate that my positive view of holding responsible has consequences for 
who counts as a responsible agent – that is, for what it means to be responsible.  
I am interested in developing a view of responsibility that is fundamentally beholden to the 
ways we use this notion in ordinary life; in this, I am influenced by Strawson’s methodology in 
“Freedom and Resentment.” Strawson emphasizes the responses we are inclined to have towards 
people we regard as responsible agents (“the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to 
involvement or participation with others in inter-personal human relationships…”) as fundamental 
to understanding the nature of responsibility (Strawson 10). Many of Strawson’s commentators have 
focused in particular on the negative reactive attitudes and their connection to holding responsible.3 
I believe the ways in which we hold people responsible in ordinary life give us reason to doubt the 
centrality of the negative reactive attitudes to this practice. Consider the parent who holds her five-
year-old responsible for not teasing his sister, or the therapist who holds her patient responsible for 
avoiding self-injurious behavior. Paradigmatically, these instances of holding responsible involve 
enforcing normative expectations, but an appreciation of the agent in question’s immaturity or 
impairment leads this enforcement not to involve the negative reactive attitudes in any way. 
My aim here is to offer a characterization of holding responsible that allows us to appreciate 
and understand the wide variety of forms this notion takes in practice. Before arriving at such a 
                                                        
3 For example, Wallace (1994) and McKenna (2012). It is also worth noting here that though 
Strawson drew responsibility theorists’ attention to the importance of the ways we treat those we 
regard as responsible agents, he never distinguishes between being responsible and holding 
responsible, nor uses the phrase ‘holding responsible’ at all. 
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view, I will first describe some alternatives. I will begin with Strawson’s characterization of 
responsibility, focusing especially on the connection between responsibility and the reactive attitudes 
on his view. I will then consider an argument from R. Jay Wallace that responsibility is only 
connected to some of the things Strawson characterizes as reactive attitudes (in particular, the 
negative reactive attitudes – that is, resentment, indignation, and guilt, and not e.g., gratitude). 
Wallace argues that this connection is forged via the notion of normative demands and expectations; 
agents are responsible when they can be sensitive to these expectations, and violating them justifies 
another’s feeling or expressing the negative reactive attitudes.4 I want to endorse Wallace’s 
suggestion that responsibility is essentially related to normative demands but reject the connection 
he draws between holding responsible and the justifiability of the negative reactive attitudes. To 
demonstrate this point, I consider how responsibility attributions function in psychotherapy (and 
discuss my view on this subject in relation to Hanna Pickard’s), as well as in other contexts where it 
does not seem that the negative reactive attitudes have a natural home.  
With these considerations in place, I then lay out my positive view of holding responsible as 
essentially involving the enforcement of norms, where norm enforcement takes on a much wider 
variety of forms than is often appreciated. In particular, I argue that one can enforce a norm by 
praising someone’s having met it or reminding someone of its existence in a forward-looking way, as 
well as by responding to norm violations.5 This broader theoretical conception of holding 
responsible affords us a better understanding of our responsibility practices, in which so-called 
“marginal agents” are held responsible despite often being exempted from some range of the 
                                                        
4 Or, in the case of guilt, one does this with respect to oneself.   
 
5 Enforcement here means the implementation of a norm, not only the imposition of negative 
consequences when one has violated a norm.   
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reactive attitudes.6 Ultimately, I claim that cases involving these agents show us how being and being 
appropriately held responsible are inextricably linked with normative expectations, beginning with 
those that arise in our close interpersonal relationships. Though I came to this view of responsibility 
in an attempt to do justice to cases involving marginal agents, I will go on to argue that it in fact 
applies to all of us. 
2. Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes 
In “Freedom and Resentment,” Strawson considers whether determinism, if true, 
undermines the legitimacy of our responsibility practices, including our tendency to hold people 
responsible for what they do. He argues that the best way to resolve this question is to consider the 
character of these practices (including how we respond to people we regard as responsible agents, 
and when we excuse or exempt people from being held responsible in everyday life) and to see if 
believing the truth of determinism rationally requires us to opt out of them. Strawson suggests that 
regarding someone as a responsible agent means being liable to have what he calls the reactive 
attitudes towards her, which are “…essentially reactions to the quality of others’ wills towards us, as 
manifested in their behaviour: to their good or ill will or indifference or lack of concern” (Strawson 
15). Resentment, for example, is “…a reaction to injury or indifference” (Strawson 15). 
                                                        
6 By responsibility practices, I mean to refer to our evaluations of people as responsible or not, and 
the ways in which we hold people responsible in light of their actions and attitudes. Examples of 
such practices include blaming, punishing, crediting, demanding an apology, and reminding someone 
what we expect of them going forward. I use the term “marginal agent” following David Shoemaker, 
who characterizes marginal agency as occurring “at the boundaries of our interpersonal community, 
where agents tend to strike us as eligible for some responsibility responses but not others” 
(Shoemaker (2015) 4). This category includes a wide variety of agents, such as children, addicts, 
adults with cognitive disabilities, etc. I am somewhat ambivalent about this terminology because I 
view it as an underestimation of the agents in question, but I use it because I take my views to be in 
dialogue with Shoemaker’s, and for ease of exposition. 
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Strawson contrasts the reactive attitudes with the objective attitude, which we 
characteristically take up with those we cannot properly regard as responsible agents due to 
impairment or immaturity.7 As he writes,  
“The objective attitude may be emotionally toned in many ways, but not in all ways: it may 
include repulsion or fear, it may include pity or even love, though not all kinds of love. But it 
cannot include the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to involvement or 
participation with others in interpersonal human relationships; it cannot include resentment, 
gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to 
feel reciprocally, for each other. If your attitude towards someone is wholly objective, then 
though you may fight him, you cannot quarrel with him, and though you may talk to him, 
even negotiate with him, you cannot reason with him. You can at most pretend to quarrel, or 
to reason, with him” (Strawson 10). 
 
The fundamental connection between responsibility and the reactive attitudes that Strawson 
urges us to recognize is not only logical, but also psychological; when we regard others as capable of 
responsible agency, and as expressing something about the quality of their wills in their behavior, we 
are disposed to respond with the reactive attitudes in light of what they have done. This orientation 
towards others is necessary for one to be able to engage in the kind of intimacy that Strawson says 
defines interpersonal human relationships, the relationships that we have with other participants in 
the moral community. When we are led to believe that others are not able to participate in this kind 
of relationship, our suspension of the reactive attitudes is a natural consequence of the shift in the 
way that we see them. We are, when taking up the objective attitude, no longer prone to viewing that 
person as a fellow community member, but rather “to see[ing] him, perhaps, as an object of social 
policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of senses, might be called treatment; as something 
                                                        
7 We also characteristically take up the objective stance towards lower animals and inanimate objects, 
which is congruent with Strawson’s view we take up the objective stance when we can’t sustain a 
certain kind of intimacy and reciprocity with that individual. Strawson claims that we can take up the 
objective attitude towards anyone on a temporary basis for this kind of reason. As he writes, “We 
have this resource and can sometimes use it: as a refuge, say, from the strains of involvement; or as 
an aid to policy; or simply out of intellectual curiosity. Being human, we cannot, in the normal case, 
do this for long, or altogether” (Strawson 10). 
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certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured 
or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided…” (Strawson 9).8  
Strawson describes a set of conditions that make us inclined to excuse or exempt people 
from the reactive attitudes, including ignorance, coercion, immaturity, or psychological abnormality. 
These conditions are meant to be familiar to us from ordinary life as reasons to abstain from 
responding as we normally would with someone we consider a responsible agent. Finding out that 
an agent was ignorant or coerced casts doubt on whether she has genuinely manifested the quality of 
will we initially took her to have (e.g., good will or indifference). An agent’s immaturity and 
psychological abnormality, on the other hand, may present obstacles to her participation in 
interpersonal relationships such that we are no longer prone to feel the reactive attitudes towards her 
(Strawson 9). These claims of Strawson’s are intended to be justified by reflection on our existing 
responsibility practices, and not by independent theoretical investigation of what conditions are 
required for responsible agency. Gary Watson elaborates on this point when he says, “Holding 
responsible is as natural and primitive in human life as friendship and animosity, sympathy and 
antipathy. It rests on needs and concerns that are not so much to be justified as acknowledged” 
(Watson (2004) 222-3). 
In Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, R. Jay Wallace takes himself to be following in the 
Strawsonian tradition of considering our responsibility practices as the ground for understanding 
what responsibility is and could be. Ultimately, he argues that being a responsible agent is 
fundamentally a matter of possessing normative competence (i.e., in Wallace’s terminology, the 
powers of reflective self-control); in particular, it is a matter of possessing “the power to grasp moral 
                                                        
8 In response to the incompatibilist determinist, Strawson insists that to take up the objective stance 
towards everyone all the time would be both inhuman and impossible. Because this argument is 
both well-known and not central to this paper, I will not rehearse it here. 
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reasons and the power to control…[one’s]…behavior in accordance with them” (Wallace 162). But 
he arrives at this claim by considering when it would be fair to hold individuals responsible in the 
sense of their being appropriate objects of the reactive attitudes (where the relevant norms of 
fairness are supposed to be drawn from everyday life).9 For example, Wallace claims that these 
norms of fairness dictate that resentment is appropriate when someone is capable of understanding 
moral reasons and capable of guiding her actions to be in accord with them, but has failed to do so 
without apparent excuse.  
Wallace also holds a distinct view about the connection between responsibility and the 
reactive attitudes. In particular, he claims that Strawson’s characterization of the reactive attitudes is 
much too broad.  In support of this claim, he argues that Strawson and his commentators tend to 
elide two distinctions: “…the distinction between reactive attitudes and other attitudes one might 
take towards persons…” on the one hand, and the distinction between the range of attitudes that are 
associated with the participant stance versus the objective stance on the other (Wallace 27). Though 
certain kinds of love, forgiveness, and gratitude may only be felt towards those with whom we take 
up the participant stance, it does not follow that those attitudes bear the same kind of relationship to 
responsibility as resentment, indignation, and guilt.  
Wallace insists that these latter attitudes, unlike the others that Strawson calls reactive 
attitudes, derive their distinctive role in our responsibility practices from their connection to 
normative expectations. As he writes, “Resentment, indignation, and guilt are essentially tied to 
expectations that we hold ourselves and others to; susceptibility to these emotions is what 
constitutes holding someone to an expectation. This mutual dependence of emotion and expectation 
                                                        
9 Note that Wallace’s conception of the reactive attitudes is much narrower than Strawson’s. 
Specifically, the reactive attitudes on his view are resentment, indignation, and guilt. I will discuss his 
argument for this claim below. 
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distinguishes the reactive attitudes…” (Wallace 21). For Wallace, possession of the capacities 
required to be properly held to normative expectations is constitutive of responsible agency, and 
resentment, indignation, and guilt (i.e., the negative reactive attitudes) are fitting responses to 
violations of such expectations. “To hold someone to an expectation,” Wallace writes, “is to be 
susceptible to a certain range of emotions (i.e., the negative reactive attitudes) if the expectation is 
violated or to believe it would be appropriate for one to feel those emotions if the expectation is 
violated” (Wallace 23). 
But Wallace and Strawson are both committed to considering our theories of responsibility 
as answerable to the ways the concept of responsibility is understood and instantiated in ordinary 
life. If we take this commitment seriously, we must recognize that there are individuals who 
participate in our responsibility practices, and who satisfy Wallace’s condition of being properly 
subject to normative expectations, who nonetheless often are and should be shielded from the 
negative reactive attitudes. I will sketch what I mean by this briefly here and return to these 
considerations later on. Consider, for example, how parents hold young children responsible for 
sharing their toys or behaving themselves in public, how an alcoholic’s therapist might hold him 
responsible for a relapse after a period of sobriety, or how an employer might hold an employee 
responsible for completing the tasks associated with his job. While holding responsible may take a 
variety of forms in these situations, they need not be seen as situations where resentment or 
indignation is appropriate.  
What unites these cases is the fact that there are norms that hold between the parties in 
question and holding responsible involves the enforcement of those norms. In other words, we 
ought to accept Wallace’s claim that holding responsible appears to be essentially connected to 
normative expectations. We should resist his suggestion, however, that enforcing those expectations 
necessarily involves the appropriateness of the negative reactive attitudes. This is not to deny that we 
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are often prone to feel those attitudes towards those we hold responsible, or that those attitudes are 
responses to our sense of the other person as an agent. It is rather to question that holding someone 
responsible means that it must be appropriate to feel the negative reactive attitudes towards her. If 
holding responsible is, as Watson suggests, a means “of expressing our concerns and demands about 
our treatment of one another,” it is only natural for that expression to take on emotional significance 
(Watson (2004) 222). But those concerns about our treatment of others cut both ways; though a 
parent might be irritated by his child’s failure to share, or a therapist might be disappointed at her 
patient’s relapse, they should (and in many cases do) also recognize the vulnerability of the parties in 
question, and the difficulties these parties may have in trying to satisfy the expectations placed on 
them. This recognition in turn mitigates the propensity the parent or therapist might have to find it 
appropriate to feel, much less express, the negative reactive attitudes. 
3. Responsibility in Psychotherapy 
In order to make this claim more vivid, let us consider the role of responsibility in 
therapeutic relationships. Finding a sense of ‘holding responsible’ that is appropriate to therapeutic 
relationships requires steering between the Scylla and Charybdis of underestimating the agency of 
people with mental illness on the one hand and viewing them as fitting objects of their therapists’ 
affective blame on the other.10 On the one hand, it is common to hear statements such as the 
following: “Like diabetes and Alzheimer’s, depression is an illness that befalls you. You are not 
responsible…or to blame [for that]. Your only responsibility is to get treatment and, once this has 
begun, to stay with the therapy until you are well again” (Joffe and Levitt 39). On the other hand, 
clinicians do in some cases blame their patients for their symptoms. Richard Friedman, a 
                                                        
10 I use the locution ‘affective blame’ following Hanna Pickard, but it is more or less interchangeable 
with blame understood in terms of the negative reactive attitudes, and contrasted with blame 
understood as merely a negative (cognitive) evaluation of the agent in question. 
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psychiatrist, gives one such example involving a patient with chronic depression who had been 
referred to him by another provider,  
“a man in his early 30s, who had suffered from depression since his teenage years. In six years 
of psychotherapy, he had been given nearly every antidepressant under the sun, but his mood 
hadn’t budged. Weeping in my office one day, he explained that he was depressed because he 
was a failure and a whiner. ‘Even my therapist agreed with me,’ he said. ‘She said that maybe 
I don’t want to get better.’” (Friedman 1) 
 
Friedman reports that, “About a month later, I saw this patient respond remarkably well to a novel 
treatment. Free of depression at last, he was joyful and relieved — an odd reaction, you must admit, 
from someone who secretly wished to be ill” (Friedman 1). 
Friedman suggests that this impulse to blame patients for their symptoms can arise when 
therapists are frustrated with their behavior or lack of response to treatment, which can create serious 
obstacles to a therapeutic alliance. Consider, for example, this description of patients with personality 
disorders cited by Hanna Pickard, a social worker and philosopher: “In his landmark study of staff‘s 
[negative] attitudes to service users with personality disorder in three High Security Hospitals in the 
UK, Len Bowers suggests:  
“The generally hopeless, pessimistic attitudes of carers can be seen to originate in the 
difficult behaviors of personality disorder patients. They bully, con, capitalize, divide, 
condition, and corrupt those around them. They make complaints over inconsequential or 
nonexistent issues in order to manipulate staff. They can be seriously violent over 
unpredictable and objectively trivial events, or may harm and disfigure themselves in ways 
that have an intense emotional impact on staff. If this were not enough, they also behave in 
the same ways towards each other, provoking serious problems that the staff have to manage 
and contain.” (Pickard 1134-5) 
 
Pickard considers this description “in many ways accurate,” and she argues that it is vital for 
therapists to hold their patients with personality disorders responsible precisely because these 
conditions are “disorders of agency” (Pickard 1134). By this Pickard means, “…[c]ore diagnostic 
symptoms or maintaining factors of…[these] disorders…are actions and omissions: patterns of 
behavior central to the nature or maintenance of the condition. For instance, borderline personality 
disorder is diagnosed in part via deliberate self-harm and attempted suicide, reckless and impulsive 
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behavior, substance use, violence, and outbursts of anger…” (Pickard 1134). Pickard suggests that it 
is a mistake simply to see these individuals as suffering from diseases that befall them and thereby 
render them wholly incapable of being or being appropriately held responsible. But though she 
emphasizes the importance of responsibility attributions in the treatment of personality disorders, 
she cautions against regarding these agents (and those in psychiatric treatment more generally) as 
appropriately subject to the full range of responsibility responses, including the negative reactive 
attitudes.  
Her proposal is that the appropriate stance for clinicians to take towards their patients 
involves holding them responsible but not blaming them for their behavior, even when that 
behavior is quite harmful to themselves and others, because blame is detrimental to the patient and 
the therapeutic relationship. As she writes, “Blaming service users [i.e., psychiatric patients] may 
trigger feelings of rejection, anger, and self-blame, which bring heightened risk of disengagement 
from treatment, distrust and breach of the therapeutic alliance, relapse, and, with service users with 
personality disorder, potentially even self-harm or attempts at suicide: it is essential that compassion 
and empathy be maintained” (Pickard 1135). 
How exactly are we to make sense of the claim that patients with personality disorders are 
responsible for doing very bad things but are not to blame for them? In order to make out this 
position, Pickard insists that there is a familiar sense of ‘responsibility’ that is not moral or 
connected to the negative reactive attitudes. She describes this sense as follows: 
“Effective clinical treatment presupposes that service users are responsible for their behavior 
insofar as they have conscious knowledge of what they are doing, and can exercise choice and 
at least a degree of control over the behavior…[T]his is a traditional and commonsense idea 
about what it means to be responsible, applicable not only to service users, but to us all. This 
idea of responsibility is essentially linked, not to morality and the reactive attitudes, but to 
agency. Crucially, on this view, we are responsible for all our actions, whether or not they are 
right, wrong, or neutral from a moral point of view. We are responsible for our actions because 
we are their agents: insofar as we know what we are doing, and can exercise choice and control 
our behavior, what we do is up to us” (Pickard 1141). 
   
 
 16 
Pickard argues that the sense of responsibility relevant to clinical contexts is non-moral because, 
“behaviors like self-harm, substance abuse, and obsessive rituals, can be damaging to the person 
without necessarily damaging others” (Pickard 1150). On her view, much of the behavior that 
clinicians should hold their patients responsible for is harmful, but it is not morally bad because it 
only or primarily affects themselves; she also suggests that such behavior is somewhat 
understandable as an expression of or method of coping with emotional distress.  
In addition, Pickard claims that if clinicians regarded their patients as morally at fault for 
their behavior, they would regard themselves as entitled to subject them to the negative reactive 
attitudes, which would undermine the effectiveness of their treatment. In some cases, Pickard argues 
that clinicians may appropriately form detached judgments that their patients are blameworthy when 
they cause harm to themselves or others without excuse, but this blame lacks the characteristic 
‘sting’ of affective blame and so does not interfere with promoting that patient’s recovery. To clarify 
what she means by this ‘detached’ sense of blame, she considers how it occurs in parent-child 
relationships.  
“For instance,” she writes, “good parenting routinely involves pointing out when a child has 
shown disregard or ill will towards a sibling, and indeed imposing negative consequences for 
it. That is part of bringing up children to treat others, including rivals, with regard and respect. 
Sometimes, no doubt, parents do this in such a way that the child feels bad and blamed. But a 
loving parent can often help a child understand that their behavior towards a sibling is neither 
decent nor permitted, without the child feeling ‘stung.’” (Pickard 1144-5). 
 
In general, detached blame seems to involve a cognitive judgment that the person in question has 
caused harm, and an imposition of negative consequences, where those consequences are not 
intended to be of an emotional nature.   
I am broadly sympathetic to Pickard’s view about how it is appropriate to hold patients 
responsible without subjecting them to negative reactive attitudes in the context of therapeutic 
relationships. I believe, however, that we can (and should) understand the significance of this 
without invoking a different, non-moral sense of responsibility. Pickard’s argument that the sense of 
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responsibility applicable to service users is non-moral depends on two assumptions about behaviors 
that are partially constitutive of disorders of agency: first, that they only or primarily cause harm to 
self rather than others, and second, that this means that they are not morally bad. Both of these 
claims are controversial and stand in need of further defense.  
More importantly, by invoking a non-moral sense of responsibility to understand what 
responsibility means in clinical contexts, Pickard leaves open the possibility that there is an 
important discontinuity between service users and the general adult population with respect to what 
it means for them to be responsible. This seems antithetical to her overall aim to humanize these 
agents, as exemplified in the following passage: “As Angela Smith elegantly points out: ‘being held 
responsible is as much a privilege as it is a burden. It signals that we are a full participant in the 
moral community’ (Smith 2005, p. 269). In other words, in holding service users with disorders of 
agency responsible, we treat them as one of us—as belonging with us, as equals” (Pickard 1149).  
Happily, one can understand the sense of responsibility relevant to clinical contexts as moral 
without that entailing the appropriateness of the negative reactive attitudes. Indeed, the example 
Pickard gives of detached blame in a parent-child relationship still seems to be moral blame; the 
child in question has “shown disregard or ill will towards a sibling,” though the kind of blame that is 
warranted avoids the characteristic ‘sting’ associated with the negative reactive attitudes (Pickard 
1144). In some cases that arise in clinical contexts, it seems fitting to recognize that psychiatric 
patients are responsible for wrongful actions they perform but excuse them from affective blame on 
the grounds that they do not deserve it given the nature of the difficulties that they face. In other 
cases, where the individual in question doesn’t have an excuse, one might still think that therapists 
are obliged (in light of professional norms, and perhaps other considerations) to exhibit a degree of 
emotional detachment towards their patients that is incompatible with affective blame. Thus, 
holding responsible may entirely avoid the negative reactive attitudes, even if one is still considering 
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moral responsibility.  
Another feature of Pickard’s view that is worth mentioning is her emphasis on the 
instrumental goods associated with the stance of responsibility without affective blame in clinical 
contexts. That is, she argues that holding responsible is beneficial, and the characteristic ‘sting’ 
associated with the negative reactive attitudes is damaging, to patients and to therapeutic 
relationships. These claims strike me as intuitive and important, and I have no interest in disputing 
them. But I also want to bring out something Pickard touches on but does not develop in much 
detail, namely that recognizing someone’s agency also constitutes a way of showing her respect; this 
undoubtedly influences the quality of a relationship, therapeutic or otherwise. Such a recognition is 
fundamentally worthwhile not just because it promotes good behavior or psychological health, but 
because it is a part of treating the individual in question as a person. 
4. The Core of Holding Responsible 
What does it mean to treat someone as a person by recognizing her agency? On Strawson’s 
view, we do this when we take up the participant stance towards her, when we see her, “as a morally 
responsible agent, as a term of moral relationships, as a member of the moral community” 
(Strawson 18). This way of regarding another person, he claims, leads to a vulnerability to feel the 
reactive attitudes, which he characterizes as, “essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill 
will or indifference of others towards us, as displayed in their attitudes and actions” (Strawson 10). 
Though we can suspend the reactive attitudes temporarily even with those whom we regard as 
morally responsible agents in order to “[seek] refuge from the strains of involvement,” Strawson 
argues that this could not be our normal mode of responding to these agents (Strawson 10).  
It is unclear whether, on Strawson’s view, one could suspend some range of the reactive 
attitudes while nevertheless having others. For example, it is unclear whether he views it as 
psychologically possible to feel emotions like gratitude or admiration at a person’s good will without 
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also being prone to feel resentment or indignation at her ill will or indifference. Thus, Strawson may 
or may not be willing to say that we are able to take up the participant stance towards those whom 
we also regard as properly shielded from the negative reactive attitudes. Wallace, on the other hand, 
separates the participant stance (i.e., the stance we take up towards fellow persons) from holding 
responsible. He argues that only the latter is to be identified with either feeling the negative reactive 
attitudes in light of a normative expectation’s being violated, or judging it appropriate to feel those 
attitudes in such circumstances.  
Rather than responding directly to Strawson’s and Wallace’s views on this subject, I would 
first like to take a step back and reflect on the variety of ways in which we respond in ordinary life to 
those we regard “as a term of moral relationships,” and what unifies those responses. After 
considering several cases meant to be representative of this variety, I will develop a distinct positive 
characterization of what it means to hold responsible, which I take to be connected to treating 
someone as a person.11 Ultimately, I want to accept Wallace’s view that to hold someone responsible 
is to hold her to normative expectations, but to question that this bears any obvious relation to the 
negative reactive attitudes. In clinical contexts like the ones Pickard describes, for example, there 
seem to be genuine instances of holding responsible where the parties in question don’t feel, or 
judge it to be appropriate to feel, those attitudes. Moreover, we should not think this is unique to 
therapeutic relationships. I will begin by discussing a therapeutic case, before describing other 
examples that also support my view of holding responsible. 
Consider how a therapist might respond to an addict who had relapsed after a period of 
sobriety and missed his appointment with her. Though it is understandable that she might feel some 
                                                        
11 I use the language of treating as a person rather than the language of the participant stance 
because I believe the precise relationship between my view and Strawson’s is complex. I share many 
of Strawson’s methodological commitments, but I want to loosen the connection Strawson draws 
between responsibility and the reactive attitudes, particularly the negative reactive attitudes.  
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degree of disappointment at her patient’s behavior, it seems inappropriate for her to meet this 
situation with anger or resentment, or to regard herself as justified in doing so. Recovering from an 
addiction is extremely difficult, and relapse is a common part of this process; fully appreciating this 
seems incompatible with viewing anger as an appropriate response to this patient. Nonetheless, I 
claim (with Pickard) that it is appropriate for her to hold her patient responsible, which might 
include reminding him that he is capable of doing better and charging him for the missed session. It 
is a common experience for addicts who relapse to feel that they are back at square one with respect 
to their recovery, and to question whether they have it in them to get better. By counseling her 
patient not to discount the value of his previous abstinence and letting him know that she still 
expects him to move forward in his recovery, she reminds him of norms that she still regards him as 
capable of upholding despite his relapse. And while therapists also have pragmatic reasons for 
charging their patients for missed sessions, this practice is also a sign that therapists see their patients 
as accountable for taking their commitments seriously.  
Consider, too, how a father might respond to a four-year-old child who refuses to share her 
toys with her sister. Again, it seems inappropriate for him to respond by feeling or expressing the 
negative reactive attitudes, or thinking they are justified in this situation. After all, it is typical for 
young children to need to learn they ought to share, and resentment is not a fitting response to 
normal development.  But it does seem appropriate for the father to hold his daughter responsible, 
which might involve explaining about the value of sharing, or asking his daughter to imagine what it 
would be like if no one shared with her, as well as the imposition of consequences (e.g., taking the 
toy away temporarily). In doing so, the father enforces a norm that his daughter has violated (e.g., 
“You have to share with your sister because that is fair, and if you don’t, I will take the toy away”), 
but without the kind of cognitive and emotional responses Wallace treats as constitutive of holding 
someone responsible. 
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These cases share some important features. First, they are situations where it seems fitting 
for the therapist and parent respectively to hold responsible without this involving the negative 
reactive attitudes in any way. Second, this holding responsible involves the enforcement of norms 
that have previously been violated by the parties in question. Third, these cases involve “marginal 
agents” – that is, individuals who are deficient in the cognitive and volitional capacities often 
associated with responsible agency. One might assume that these deficiencies alone serve to explain 
why the addict and the child are not fitting targets of the negative reactive attitudes. According to 
this line of thought, though it may be appropriate to act as if we hold them responsible, they are not 
responsible in the same sense or to the same degree as psychologically normal adults. Thus, one 
might worry that it is illicit to infer from these cases that holding responsible properly understood 
does not require feeling or regarding oneself as justified in feeling the negative reactive attitudes. I 
do not share this view about the responsibility of marginal agents, but more immediately, I also 
believe there are examples of holding non-marginal agents responsible that do not involve the 
presence or justifiability of the negative reactive attitudes. Let us consider one below. 
Imagine that you are an employer and that one of your employees has recently lost his 
mother. His grieving is interfering with his doing his job effectively, and you need him to complete 
one particular project or he will lose an important client. Although this is a delicate situation, it 
seems appropriate for you to hold him responsible for completing the tasks associated with his job. 
You might do this by reminding him that he knows this project better than anyone else in the office, 
and though you know he is having a difficult time, you expect him to be able to meet his deadlines; 
if he can’t, you will have to give the account to someone else. But even assuming he falls short of 
these expectations, anger or resentment are not fitting responses. Here again, holding responsible 
involves the enforcement of a norm with respect to his job performance, but does not involve the 
justifiability of the negative reactive attitudes.   
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In this case, as well as the two I considered above, the negative reactive attitudes are an inapt 
response, and a willingness to feel those attitudes or see them as justified seems to evince an 
impatience with or lack of compassion for the persons in question. But the responses that the 
parent, therapist, and employer in fact have are nevertheless instances of holding responsible. They 
involve the enforcement of norms, and the recognition of that person as an agent - in particular, 
one who is capable of upholding the relevant expectations and appreciating their significance. This 
norm enforcement that lies at the core of holding responsible is not merely a way of incentivizing 
good behavior, but of showing the other party a kind of respect. It reflects a presumption of 
reciprocity between the person holding responsible and the person being held responsible – that you 
can expect something of each other, and are able to recognize the grounds for those expectations in 
your relationship (either as individuals or as fellow members of the interpersonal community). 
Notice that if this is how we understand what it means to hold someone responsible, we do 
not only do this when we regard her as having violated the relevant norm. We also hold her 
responsible when we praise or give credit to her for doing what she was supposed to, or draw her 
attention to the relevant norm in a forward-looking way.12 As children get older and are told that 
they are entrusted with more responsibilities by their parents (say, to walk themselves home from 
school safely and without too many diversions), they are thereby being held responsible on this view. 
Similarly, one is held responsible when one takes on a new job and is told on the first day what one’s 
responsibilities are – that is, what others expect of one in this role. Or suppose someone sets a goal 
of abstaining from self-harm for a certain length of time and succeeds in doing so. Her therapist’s 
praising her for this constitutes an instance of holding responsible. Likewise, if someone has an 
                                                        
12 More precisely, praising or crediting someone with respect to some norm counts as holding her 
responsible if, had she violated that norm, she would also have been held responsible (e.g., by being 
blamed or punished in some way).   
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arrangement with her advisor to send her writing at regular intervals and succeeds in doing this, an 
advisor who recognizes this and credits her for it would be holding her responsible (provided she 
would also have been held responsible if she had not met the relevant expectations).  
The idea that these sorts of cases are, as I describe them, instances of holding responsible 
lends further support to the idea that holding responsible does not necessitate the appropriateness 
of the negative reactive attitudes. For these are clearly cases where the negative reactive attitudes are 
not called for. Though they involve normative demands, those demands have either been satisfied, 
or the person in question hasn’t had a chance to satisfy them yet. In addition, I have described cases 
here that involve both marginal and non-marginal agents, and the sense in which they are held 
responsible is fundamentally the same.  
One can also enforce norms without this presumption of reciprocity, though one would not 
be holding them responsible. I will hereafter refer to this as holding someone “shallowly 
accountable.” An agent can be (and be appropriately held) shallowly accountable whenever a norm 
applies in a certain social context, and the agent in question is able to understand that there is such a 
norm in that context and act in accordance with it. If a psychopath is not capable of being motivated 
by moral considerations, for example, but he recognizes that it is widely considered morally wrong 
to lie to others for one’s personal gain, he might be shallowly accountable for not violating that 
expectation. Holding someone shallowly accountable, like holding her responsible, will involve the 
enforcement of a norm, but the aim of this practice is simply to deter the agent in question from 
committing harmful norm violations. The aims of holding someone shallowly accountable, as 
opposed to holding her responsible, are therefore strictly instrumental. In other words, it is simply a 
way of incentivizing good behavior, which is of particular use when agents seem incapable of being 
motivated to behave well for non-self-interested reasons. I will offer a more extended treatment of 
shallow accountability in Chapter 4, where I discuss the boundaries of the responsibility community. 




In summary, I want to highlight four aspects of my view of holding responsible. First, on 
this view, the core of holding someone responsible is regarding her as accountable for upholding a 
norm. Second, we do this not only when norms have been violated, but also when they have been 
upheld, or when we want to remind someone of that norm in a forward-looking way. Third, holding 
someone responsible does not thereby mean it is appropriate to feel, or regard oneself as justified in 
feeling the negative reactive attitudes. Finally, this conception of holding responsible applies to 
marginal and non-marginal agents alike.  
 I began developing this view about the nature of holding responsible in order to do justice to 
how we hold marginal agents responsible, which frequently has nothing obviously to do with the 
negative reactive attitudes. The view I arrived at shares elements with both Wallace’s and Pickard’s 
views of holding responsible. In particular, I think Wallace is right to emphasize the connection 
between holding responsible and normative demands, although I disagree that to hold someone 
responsible, one must judge that they have fallen short of such demands, or that they are thereby the 
appropriate object of one’s resentment or indignation. Likewise, I endorse Pickard’s suggestions that 
one can hold someone responsible while nonetheless seeing it as appropriate to protect them from 
the characteristic ‘sting’ associated with the negative reactive attitudes, and that this is an important 
part of therapeutic relationships. Unlike Pickard, however, I claim that the sense of responsibility 
that is operative in clinical contexts is garden-variety accountability. 
 The motivation I have given for my positive view of holding responsible primarily comes 
from the examples I have given, which represent some important and undertheorized ways we use 
this concept in ordinary life. These cases, I think, demonstrate the value of understanding holding 
responsible as broader than seeing someone as the fitting object of the negative reactive attitudes, or 
even as deserving of blame. But one might worry that I have not given sufficient argument that my 
   
 
 25 
view describes the core of holding responsible. In particular, one might question whether the 
examples I have given are ones where the therapist, parent, and employer genuinely hold the 
relevant party responsible, as opposed to acting as if they do for pragmatic reasons. I see no reason 
to describe these cases as instances of pretense; they seem to involve perfectly reasonable responses 
to another person in light of regarding her as subject to a norm. The only motivation for resisting 
the claim that these cases are instances of holding responsible seems to come from including the 
justifiability of the negative reactive attitudes in the definition of holding responsible. Such a 
definition would beg the question against my view. 
I began this paper by noting the plurality of ways responsibility functions in ordinary life and 
philosophical theorizing, and I do not wish to deny this now. Nonetheless, I take myself to have 
identified a central strain of responsibility understood in terms of accountability, which is essential to 
correctly understanding what is going on in the cases I have considered.13 In other words, this 
conception of holding responsible is an important one, even if it is not exhaustive. In particular, by 
rejecting the idea that holding someone responsible means thereby finding it appropriate to be angry 
with her, my view makes it clear that we do in fact hold marginal agents responsible. Moreover, 
careful attention to these practices shows us how to understand Strawson’s powerful suggestion that 
responsibility bears an essential connection to interpersonal relationships even if holding responsible 
is broadened beyond cases that involve the negative reactive attitudes. Relationships are sources of 
                                                        
13 Gary Watson, for example, famously argues that responsibility as accountability is not the only 
sense of responsibility relevant to our responsibility practices; there is also responsibility as 
attributability, which he describes as follows: “conduct can be attributable or imputable to an 
individual as its agent and is open to appraisal that is therefore appraisal of the individual as an 
adopter of ends. Attributability in this sense is a kind of responsibility. In virtue of the capacities in 
question, the individual is an agent in a strong sense, an author of her conduct, and is in an 
important sense answerable for what she does” (Watson (1996) 229). My interest here is not in 
denying that attributability could also be a form of responsibility, but in developing a view of 
responsibility as accountability that captures the full array of cases in which we in fact hold each 
other accountable. 
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norms, and make it possible to adjust and enforce expectations in accordance with our 
understanding of each other.   
All of this allows us to begin to see that when we hold young children, for example, 
responsible, we are not merely pretending that they are responsible in order to teach them how to 
behave. Rather, we are engaging in the very same kind of practice that we engage in with non-
marginal agents, namely enforcing norms to which the agent in question is subject. Recognizing this 
same underlying structure in our responsibility responses to marginal and non-marginal agents in 
turn allows us to appreciate the continuity between these agents as participants in the moral 
community.  
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Responsibility and the Problem of So-Called Marginal Agents 
 
1. Introduction 
Much of the existing philosophical literature about responsibility begins by asking what it 
takes for an agent to be responsible. This line of inquiry then frequently proceeds by considering 
what capacities might distinguish paradigm responsible agents (i.e., psychologically normal adult 
human beings) from lower animals, inanimate objects, and human beings who are not responsible 
agents par excellence. Possible candidates for such capacities include rationality, self-control, and the 
capacity to deliberate before acting.  
In addition to the interest philosophers have had in giving accounts of the capacities that 
underwrite responsible agency, there has been increasing interest in our social practices of holding 
people responsible. There has not been sufficient investigation, however, of how those practices 
involve agents who are impaired or immature, and therefore deficient in the capacities typically 
regarded as necessary for being responsible.14 Yet in ordinary life, we hold individuals who are 
deficient in these capacities responsible all the time; this is a vital part of, for example, parenting and 
psychotherapy. Careful attention to these undertheorized contexts shows us that to be responsible 
for anything is always to be responsible to someone for something, or so I will argue here.  
                                                        
14 There is, as I noted earlier, a substantial literature on the question of whether an agent’s being 
responsible is metaphysically more basic than her being held responsible. This priority question, 
while important, is independent of what I am claiming here: that is, that holding impaired or 
immature agents (i.e., “marginal agents”) responsible is a legitimate and commonplace part of our 
responsibility practices that remains undertheorized. 
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2. The Contours of Our Practice 
In this chapter, I will consider a range of cases of holding people responsible that has been 
underexplored in the existing literature: cases involving so-called “marginal agents” such as young 
children, people with cognitive disabilities, and people with psychiatric disorders. What I will say 
about these cases leaves open the question of just how responsible these agents are according to 
theories that identify responsibility with the rational and volitional capacities described above. My 
discussion is motivated instead by the observation that in some important ways, these individuals are 
undoubtedly participants in at least some of our responsibility practices. A parent who chose not to 
hold his daughter responsible for anything merely because she was a child, for example, would be 
misguided at best; this would be similarly true of a therapist who chose not to hold her patients 
responsible for coming to the majority of their sessions as scheduled because they have psychiatric 
difficulties.  
That said, responsibility responses to these individuals, should they fail to meet their 
responsibilities, typically are and should be modified in accordance with the individuals’ deficits: we 
do not feel resentment towards a young child who blurts out the first thing on her mind, and we are 
often unclear how to respond when an addict struggles to maintain his sobriety, even when we 
would resent or blame others who behave similarly. Both the inclusion of marginal agents in some 
of our responsibility practices and the fact that our responses to them are modified stand in need of 
explanation. 
Marginal agents are identified as such in virtue of the deficits they may have in the capacities 
typically associated with responsible agency. As such, the category is extremely broad; it includes 
individuals as different from each other as four-year-olds, adults with cognitive disabilities, and 
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addicts. Nonetheless, our responsibility responses to marginal agents share some common features, 
as I will illustrate.15  
Case: Sunday Brunch 
You are at a restaurant on the weekend, and your five-year-old child is yelling at the top of 
his lungs. The restaurant is packed and your son is screaming because he is bored. At this point, 
many people in the restaurant probably hold you responsible for your son’s screaming; his behavior 
is obnoxious, and others would appreciate it if you could get him to calm down and be quiet. The 
host, for example, might wish that both of you would go outside. It also seems appropriate for you 
to hold your son responsible for his behavior. You might do this by telling him he needs to stop 
yelling and mentioning the use of “inside voices,” or by telling him that if he behaves himself, you’ll 
be leaving soon. Though these responses are different from the ways you would hold an adult 
responsible for similar conduct, you are certainly responding to your child’s behavior by reminding 
him of expectations that he is not living up to, and the hope is that this reminder will motivate him 
to behave better. In addition, though you might expect your child not to scream just because he is 
bored, you might not similarly expect him to abstain from screaming if he burns his tongue on hot 
soup, as you presumably would with most adults. 
 Case: Noon Somewhere #1 
An alcoholic agrees to meet an acquaintance from work for coffee at 8am. When they greet 
                                                        
15 Although these examples are hypothetical, I take them to reflect perfectly ordinary circumstances 
one might find oneself in during the course of one’s life. I also take them to be representative of the 
most central aspects of our practices of holding marginal agents responsible, but this claim 
necessitates a caveat: Much of the philosophical literature about marginal agency focuses on 
psychopaths, and it is unclear to me that the account I give of holding marginal agents responsible 
would apply in any neat way to psychopaths. Those cases ought to be treated differently regardless 
because of the nature of psychopaths’ impairments with respect to empathy and interpersonal 
engagement, and the limitations those specific impairments may place on psychopaths ever 
participating in the moral community, even in an attenuated sense. For a more extended treatment 
of psychopathy, see Chapter 4.  
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each other, the alcoholic seems to be acting strangely, saying odd things at full volume. The 
acquaintance then realizes that he smells alcohol on his colleague’s breath and is unsure how to 
respond. On the one hand, the acquaintance may reasonably be annoyed or concerned by his 
colleague’s behavior, but on the other, he might wonder what to say (given that being intoxicated 
that early in the morning makes him suspect that his colleague is an alcoholic, and he doesn’t know 
his colleague very well). It seems appropriate for him to withhold angry or judgmental responses he 
might have been inclined to have before realizing his colleague was drunk so early in the day.  
Case: Noon Somewhere #2 
Now imagine the same individual struggling with alcoholism who arrives similarly 
intoxicated to his 8am therapy appointment. It seems much more appropriate for his therapist to call 
him out, and insist on the importance of being sober for their appointments. In fact, a therapist who 
ignored this concern would strike us as negligent. 
While these cases involve many considerations having to do with responsibility, I will focus 
on some that are especially salient. In Sunday Brunch, there are very different expectations for how 
the parent and the host of the restaurant ought to conduct themselves, though both might have 
reason to be frustrated at the child’s screaming. Similarly, both the acquaintance and the therapist of 
the alcoholic in Noon Somewhere may be concerned and irritated by the alcoholic’s inebriated state, 
but there is nonetheless a contrast in how it is appropriate for them to respond.  
Moreover, the reason why the restaurant host and the acquaintance might rightly bite their 
tongues in these circumstances is that it is arguably not their place to hold the child or the alcoholic 
responsible (who is more or less a stranger to them).16 The host of the restaurant would probably 
                                                        
16 While the host might appropriately hold the parent responsible for how she handles her son’s 
screaming, that is a separate matter.  
 
   
 
 31 
respond quite differently to a (presumed psychologically normal) adult who had a similar outburst in 
the restaurant, as would the acquaintance to a colleague who neglected social obligations with no 
apparent mitigating circumstances. Finally, the ways in which the parent and the therapist hold those 
in their care responsible is sensitive to their capacities; the parent’s responses in Sunday Brunch, for 
example, reflect both her frustration at her son’s behavior and her knowledge that it is difficult for 
him to control how he expresses his emotions at this age. While she may disapprove of his behavior 
and express this to him, the tone of her disapproval and its expression are colored by her knowledge 
that he is young and it would be challenging for him to behave himself in the circumstances.  
In summary, these cases bring out three central features of our practices of holding 
responsible as they involve marginal agents: 
1. The norms to which one holds marginal agents responsible may (though need not) have 
different content than those that psychologically normal adults are expected to uphold.17  
2. The ways in which it is appropriate to hold marginal agents responsible may (though need not) 
have a different character or tone than the ways one ought to hold psychologically normal adults 
responsible. 
3. It matters significantly what one’s relationship is to a given marginal agent whether or not one 
should hold her responsible. 
 
                                                        
17 Though I will go on to argue that all four of the candidate explanations I consider for how we 
hold marginal agents responsible can explain this feature, it is not entirely uncontroversial. Scanlon, 
for instance, writes, “We do not blame young children for things such as rudeness or self-
centeredness in the same way that we would blame an adult. This is not because the relevant 
standards of conduct are different for children. We would not say to a child, ‘It is all right to hit 
people now, since you are a child, but don’t do it later when you are grown up’” (Scanlon 156). But 
in Sunday Brunch, it seems plausible that the child might be responsible for not screaming because 
he’s bored, though not responsible for not screaming after burning his tongue, though ordinarily we 
would regard adults as responsible for not screaming in either case. Arguably, then, some of the 
relevant standards of conduct are different for children, which is all I am claiming here. 
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3. Possible Explanations 
Below, I will consider some accounts of why we hold marginal agents responsible in the 
particular ways that we do (that is, why 1, 2, and 3 above are true). To state the explananda explicitly, 
we need to account for the fact that we include marginal agents in some of our responsibility 
practices at all, despite judging that they are deficient in the capacities typically associated with 
responsible agency, and we must also account for the three features above that describe the 
character of that inclusion. Before arguing for my own view, which is that we hold marginal agents 
responsible largely in virtue of norms that arise in the context of certain kinds of relationships, I will 
consider three alternatives: the pretense view, the degrees of responsibility view, and Shoemaker’s 
tripartite view of responsibility. Ultimately, I will argue that these other explanations are inadequate, 
primarily because they do not explain the third feature — that is, they fail to account for the vital 
role that our relationships to marginal agents play in our practices of holding them responsible. 
3a. The pretense view 
According to the pretense view, we include marginal agents in our responsibility practices 
only in a derivative sense. The account is roughly the following: some individuals who are in close 
relationships with marginal agents (especially their caregivers) have to teach them how to behave and 
how to take responsibility for their behavior, and the most effective way to do this is by holding 
them responsible. That said, parents of young children, for example, are well aware that their 
children are not really responsible, and this knowledge undermines the possibility that holding them 
responsible could be entirely genuine. When we hold psychologically normal adults responsible, we 
do so in virtue of believing that they display a level of normative and agential competence that 
marginal agents don’t have, but we can pretend marginal agents have this competence for the sake 
of helping them to develop the relevant capacities and learn moral norms. Any justification for our 
practices of holding marginal agents responsible on the pretense view comes from the instrumental 
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role those practices play in helping to integrate marginal agents into the moral community, and 
teaching them how to behave properly.18, 19  
There is a kernel of truth in the pretense view, namely that holding marginal agents 
responsible is often an important part of moral education, and as such is frequently predicated on 
the aspirations those in close relationships with marginal agents have for their growth and 
development. But the motivation for endorsing the pretense view comes from a theoretical 
commitment I am questioning, namely that genuinely holding someone responsible is only justifiable 
if one believes that they possess a relatively high degree of normative and agential competence. 
Although this commitment is a part of much of the philosophical literature on responsibility, it is 
not without its drawbacks.  
                                                        
18 For one statement of this view, see Vargas’ Building Better Beings. Vargas claims that though 
“Comparatively young children might well be responsible agents in very specific or local 
circumstances…it seems fair to characterize a good deal of parenting and acculturation as bent to 
the task of expanding the range of circumstances in which the targets have the capacities required 
for moral responsibility. Initially, much of this happens via feigned attributions of responsibility. In 
contrast to genuinely holding someone responsible, moral education is typically undertaken in the 
way characterized by traditional moral influence theorists, that is, with the aspiration of influencing. 
There is no assumption that the target is a responsible agent. Indeed, the point of feigning praise 
and blame just is to get children to such a point where they have the capacities that are required for 
genuine praise and blame. In contrast, holding someone morally responsible assumes the relevant 
capacities are present and that the agent has failed to demonstrate the appropriate form of moral 
concern.” (Vargas 229). 
19 See also Wallace’s (1994) discussion of children’s responsibility in Responsibility and the Moral 
Sentiments. He writes, “Because children lack…[the powers of reflective self-control]…or are still in 
the process of acquiring them, it would be unreasonable to hold them fully accountable with respect 
to the moral obligations we accept. But of course we often treat them as if they were accountable 
agents when they violate those obligations…[P]artly it is because treating children as if they were 
responsible is believed to be the most effective way to stimulate the development of their powers of 
reflective self-control” (Wallace (1994) 167, emphasis in original). Wallace’s complete view on 
holding children responsible, however, is actually a hybrid of the pretense view and the degrees of 
responsibility view below. Darwall also offers a similar account of holding children responsible in his 
discussion of ‘non-central cases’ in The Second Person Standpoint (Darwall 86-8). 
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Holding marginal agents responsible is an essential part of many relationships those agents 
have, and in those contexts, it doesn’t seem like just a noble lie. In other words, when parents hold 
their children responsible, most conceive of themselves as doing so genuinely and not merely with 
an eye toward behavior modification. An analogous point seems to hold in therapeutic relationships, 
where therapists hold their patients responsible in a way that ideally reflects their respect for their 
patients’ agency as well as the desire for them to avoid self-destructive behavior. It is important to 
respect the phenomenology of those relationships, where recognition of a marginal agent’s 
limitations doesn’t preclude authentically holding her responsible, though it may require modifying 
some of our ordinary responsibility responses. If we are not forced to describe those practices as a 
kind of pretense whose justification is merely instrumental, we should avoid doing so. 
3b. The degrees of responsibility view 
The pretense view also offers no substantive explanation for the three aforementioned 
features of our practices of holding marginal agents responsible, though it is compatible with them. 
There are alternative views, however, that do have more to say by way of explanation of those 
features. One straightforward way to understand how we might hold marginal agents responsible 
despite their being deficient in the capacities typically associated with responsible agency is to say 
that there are degrees of responsibility. We hold marginal agents responsible because they are 
responsible, but to a lesser degree than psychologically normal adults.20 At first glance, this view 
seems quite plausible: many of the conditions that make someone count as a marginal agent, 
including childhood and many psychiatric difficulties, are experienced temporarily.  Outgrowing or 
                                                        
20 Coates and Swenson (2013), who are proponents of one version of this view, explain degrees of 
responsibility in terms of degrees of reasons-responsiveness. Tiboris (2014) develops a similar view 
about children in particular according to which they are less responsible because they have 
diminished normative competence. There could well be other views in the same family that focus on 
other capacities that are regarded as both necessary for responsible agency and that admit of degrees.  
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overcoming such conditions plausibly includes growth in the capacities associated with responsible 
agency.  
Moreover, facilitating such growth may require holding those agents responsible while 
acknowledging that their capacities for self-control or rational deliberation may be limited. As 
Strawson writes,  
"Parents and others concerned with the care and upbringing of young children...are dealing 
with creatures who are potentially and increasingly capable both of holding, and being objects 
of, the full range of human and moral attitudes, but are not yet truly capable of either. The 
treatment of such creatures must therefore represent a kind of compromise, constantly shifting 
in one direction, between objectivity of attitude and developed human attitudes. Rehearsals 
insensibly modulate toward true performances” (Strawson 20). 
 
This point of Strawson’s is related to the first two features I described as central to our practices of 
holding marginal agents responsible: the restricted scope of the normative demands we can 
appropriately place on these agents (in this case, children), and the ways in which enforcing those 
demands is colored by knowledge of the agent’s present limitations and her potential to overcome 
them. The compromise Strawson mentions is reflected in the fact that marginal agents participate in 
some of our responsibility practices, but our responses to them are modified in light of their deficits.  
The degrees of responsibility view, if true, would explain why the normative expectations 
that are properly placed on marginal agents may be less demanding, and may be enforced in 
different ways, namely because this reflects an understanding of marginal agents’ limitations. A 
therapist might believe that her patient ought to quit drinking entirely, for example, but knows this is 
a tall order. In light of that, she might set smaller, more manageable goals for his alcohol use (e.g., 
that he cut back to a certain amount and disclose how much he is drinking to her), and enforce these 
goals without the use of anger and resentment that are common parts of interpersonal blame with 
psychologically normal adults. What the cases I’ve described invite us to see, however, is that 
introducing the notion of degrees of responsibility is not sufficient to understand our responsibility 
responses to marginal agents. In particular, it does not capture the differences between the ways 
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those in close relationships with marginal agents are entitled to hold them responsible in comparison 
with mere strangers or acquaintances.  
If all that was going on in Sunday Brunch, for example, was that a young child is less 
responsible and should therefore be held less responsible for his screaming than a psychologically 
normal adult, then it would be just as appropriate for the host of the restaurant to hold the child 
responsible as for the parent to do so. But this is false; I take it that most parents would respond to 
the host holding the child responsible by saying that the host is out of line, and many parents would 
accept responsibility for the child’s screaming even if they did nothing to cause it. The parent-child 
relationship seems to play an essential role in understanding this case, and the degrees of 
responsibility view cannot account for this on its own. A similar, though less striking, contrast holds 
between the acquaintance and the therapist in Noon Somewhere #1 and #2. 
 3c. Shoemaker’s tripartite view of responsibility 
 In his recent book, Responsibility from the Margins, David Shoemaker develops a view of 
responsibility that tries to account for much of the complexity involved in holding a wide range of 
marginal agents responsible. Unlike the degrees of responsibility view, Shoemaker doesn’t 
characterize the deficits of marginal agents in terms of their being at a different point on a unified 
responsibility scale from psychologically normal adults. Instead, he characterizes our primary attitude 
about holding marginal agents responsible as ambivalence – not because we’re uncertain about 
whether or not they are responsible, or just how responsible they are, but rather because, “[t]hese are 
agents who often strike us as ineligible only for some subset of responsibility responses while 
nevertheless being fully eligible for others” (Shoemaker (2015) viii). 
Following Strawson, Shoemaker views responsibility as being essentially connected to the 
reactive attitudes (e.g., gratitude, resentment, and indignation) and thereby to the quality of an 
agent’s will. As Strawson writes, “The reactive attitudes…are essentially reactions to the quality of 
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others’ wills towards us, as manifested in their behavior: to their good or ill will or indifference or 
lack of concern” (Strawson 15). For example, I might feel resentment towards someone who 
intentionally pushes past me in line because he is displaying disregard towards me (as well as others 
in the line), and expressing this resentment would be one way of holding him responsible.  
Shoemaker locates the source of our ambivalence about holding marginal agents responsible in the 
claim that ‘quality of will’ is ambiguous between three senses that can come apart.21 As such, he 
claims that we need to understand responsibility as admitting of three corresponding senses: 
attributability, accountability, and answerability. We are ambivalent in the sense Shoemaker describes 
because marginal agents are responsible in some of these senses but not all (Shoemaker (2015) viii). 
 To his credit, Shoemaker spends considerable effort attending to the empirical details of 
different conditions that afflict marginal agents and the consequences of those details for his 
account of responsibility. His account is thus capable of providing a very fine-grained analysis of 
why the norms to which we hold specific marginal agents responsible might have different content 
and conditions of enforcement (i.e., the first two features I referred to above). But Shoemaker offers 
no real explanation for the third feature, namely why one’s relationship to a given marginal agent 
should matter so profoundly in determining whether or not one is entitled to hold her responsible.22 
                                                        
21 Shoemaker calls these three senses “quality of character, quality of judgment, and quality of 
regard” (Shoemaker (2015) viii). They define quality of will in terms of one’s character traits, one’s 
capacity for judgment and rational self-governance, and the regard or concern one has for others, 
respectively (Shoemaker (2015) 10-13). Though these details are important for having a full 
understanding of Shoemaker’s view, they are not relevant for my purposes.  
 
22 More recently, Shoemaker (2017) has defended a response-dependent view of responsibility. His 
discussion of this view focuses on blameworthiness and its connections to anger. He characterizes 
this view as follows: “The blameworthy (in the realm of accountability) just is whatever merits anger 
(the anger-worthy); that is, someone is blameworthy (and so accountable) for X if and only if, and in 
virtue of the fact that, she merits anger for X” (Shoemaker (2017) 508). The sense of meriting in 
question for Shoemaker is to be understood in terms of D’Arms and Jacobson’s (2000) “fittingness” 
framework. Though this is a view on which holding responsible is metaphysically prior to being 
responsible, Shoemaker nonetheless seems to think that the targets of our responsibility responses 
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In fact, he seems committed to locating the differences between how we hold marginal agents 
responsible and how we hold psychologically normal adults responsible in capacities internal to 
these agents rather than in their interpersonal relationships.23  
Interestingly, Shoemaker notes that with at least some kinds of marginal agents, those in 
close relationships to those agents have fairly robust responsibility responses while others do not. As 
he writes, “...with their caregivers, friends, and family, adults with mild intellectual disabilities (MID) 
are quite often treated as full-fledged moral agents (at least with respect to a subset of moral 
demands), susceptible to full-throated reactive emotions and other responsibility responses” 
(Shoemaker (2015) 31). Moreover, these responsibility responses on the part of caregivers and loved 
ones seem to achieve uptake. As Shoemaker writes, “Adults with MID seem generally able to 
understand the emotional communications of agential anger and gratitude as such, see and 
appreciate the distress associated with injuries and harms to others as reasons of the right sort, and 
feel what the injured or harmed party feels in being so affected” (Shoemaker (2015) 185).  
 “…[S]trangers (who are aware of…[their conditions]…) but who are not in…[close] 
                                                        
are agential capacities of individual agents. As he writes, “…[D]ifferent responsibility emotions 
could target very different agential capacities, which could well mean that they implicate different 
types of responsibility” (Shoemaker (2017) 521). If he is committed to his response-dependent 
methodology in a thoroughgoing way and grew to be sympathetic to the thought that our 
relationships play an irreducible role in making certain types of responsibility responses fitting or 
unfitting, then his view would be compatible with mine. But this would be quite a substantial 
departure from his extended (2015) treatment of responsibility and marginal agency, and does not 
seem to be something he has in mind even in the (2017) paper. 
23 He also gives the following schematic way of characterizing how responsibility attributions are to 
be understood: “To be a responsible agent is to be worthy of X for Y in virtue of Z, where X refers 
to some kind of “praising” and “blaming” responsibility responses, Y refers to something like 
actions or attitudes, and Z refers to the responsibility-maker, be it, for example, one’s capacity for 
reasons-responsiveness, one’s capacity for having and expressing one’s deep self, or, as Strawson 
would have it, one’s capacity for having a quality of will” (Shoemaker (2015) 17). Notice that all of 
the candidate responsibility-making capacities Shoemaker proposes are internal in the way I’ve 
described. 
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relationships…with those with MID,” however, “may think that [individuals with such disabilities] 
may not be able to recognize them as a fellow member of the accountability community…” and are 
therefore reluctant to hold them accountable (Shoemaker (2015) 187). Shoemaker writes that, 
“...such reluctance may be appropriate. Because of their developmental impairments, adults with 
MID may indeed have difficulty...accessing or appreciating abstract principles about mutual 
recognition and accountability amongst all members of the accountability community” (Shoemaker 
(2015) 187). In other words, while people with MID experience empathy and other moral emotions 
when observing someone in distress, for example, they may have difficulty understanding practical 
demands, expectations, or criticism placed on them by strangers. In contrast, they may well 
understand robust responsibility responses on the part of caregivers and others they are in close 
relationships with, and presumably those relationships themselves play an important role in securing 
that understanding.  
Shoemaker accounts for how a caregiver’s, friend’s, or relative’s relationship to an individual 
with MID can inform her appropriately holding that individual responsible by focusing on how that 
relationship facilitates the person with MID’s understanding of the relevant practical demands. It 
may be true that people with MID better understand practical demands given by their caregivers and 
loved ones, and this may partially explain why these relationships are typically the only ones that 
involve “full-throated” responsibility responses. But Shoemaker still holds that the sense in which 
individuals with MID are responsible is solely a function of capacities internal to them, and therefore 
makes their relationships incidental to their responsibility. Moreover, this kind of account about the 
role of relationships in our responsibility practices doesn’t generalize to the full range of marginal 
agents.24 For example, it doesn’t seem to be a lack of understanding of social norms that keeps the 
                                                        
24 There are important differences among the conditions that make individuals count as marginal 
agents, so being unable to provide a general account of how relationships affect responsibility 
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alcoholic from arriving at his appointments sober, and he would understand his acquaintance and 
his therapist holding him responsible equally well. What seems to be at issue here is not only the 
relevant responsibility responses being intelligible because of the relationship between the agents in 
question, but those responses being appropriate given the nature of that relationship. 
3d. The relationship-based norms view 
 While there are important differences between the three views I’ve considered above, they all 
locate the differences between how we hold marginal agents responsible and how we hold 
psychologically normal adults responsible solely in capacities internal to those agents. But this 
distorts the phenomena of interest. We cannot understand our practices of holding marginal agents 
responsible without recognizing that our relationships to these agents have a fundamental role to 
play in those practices. 
i. The limits of standing 
There have been some attempts in the philosophical literature to capture how our 
relationships to a person or their actions impact how we especially should respond to them in light 
of what they have done. One central notion in this literature is ‘standing to blame.’ The thought 
behind this notion is that whether a blameworthy individual should in fact be blamed depends not 
only on whether or not they are responsible for doing something bad but also on whether anyone 
bears the appropriate kind of relationship to the person’s actions such that they can rightly issue 
blame (i.e., has standing to blame).25 On a standard view of this notion, agents must meet the 
                                                        
responses to these agents is not a decisive objection to Shoemaker’s view. I mean only to put 
pressure on the idea that the best way to understand why those close to individuals with MID have 
“full-throated” responsibility responses to them while others refrain from doing so is solely in terms 
of those individuals’ capacity to understand their respective practical demands.  
25 There are many conceptions of blame and what it requires. The differences among these views are 
substantial, but they are not the central focus of this paper, and what I say about the notion of 
standing is neutral between them. In particular, my claim that the host of the restaurant has standing 
to blame the child, though it is nonetheless inappropriate for her to do so, does not depend on 
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following conditions in order to have standing to blame:  
1. They must have an identifiable stake in the wrongdoing in question (i.e., it must be their business). 
2. They must be contemporaries (i.e., part of the same moral community) as the potential target of 
blame. 
3. They must not have engaged in similar wrongdoing in the past such that their blame would be 
hypocritical. 
4. They must not be responsible for or complicit in the wrongdoing. 
If all of the potential blamers for a wrongful action fail to meet these conditions, then those 
who endorse the notion of standing would claim that blame is inappropriate even though the 
individual who performed the action is blameworthy (Bell 264). 
The notion of standing is not particularly illuminating for understanding how our 
relationships matter to our responsibility responses to marginal agents. Invoking standing does 
introduce some relational considerations with respect to the appropriateness of blame – specifically, 
that the blamer and target of blame must be contemporaries, and the blamer must avoid hypocrisy, 
complicity, and nosiness in relation to that particular action. But these conditions entail little if 
anything about the nature of the relationship between the blamer and target of blame, which seems 
to be a vital part of an adequate description of the cases at hand.26 For example, on the standard 
conception of standing, it looks as though the host at the restaurant would have standing to blame 
                                                        
thinking that blame must be expressed publicly. Though it may be less ethically problematic for the 
host to form a judgment that the child is blameworthy for his screaming than to actually express this 
to him, both of these responses strike me as misplaced. 
26 One might think that whether a particular wrongful action is one’s business is a reflection of the 
relationship between the potential blamer and target of blame, but this need not be so. For example, 
the child’s screaming is the business of the restaurant staff because it is their job to accommodate 
other customers, not because of any relationship between the staff and the child. Nonetheless, we 
would typically regard it as inappropriate for the restaurant staff to hold the child responsible. 
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the five-year-old screaming in her restaurant, though it nonetheless seems inappropriate for her to 
do so.  
ii. Relationships as sources of norms  
The key to understanding how relationships inform our responsibility responses to marginal 
agents is to view close relationships as sources of some of the norms we expect these agents to 
uphold. The reason why the parent but not the host in Sunday Brunch is entitled to hold her child 
responsible is that she has established expectations with her son for his behavior, where there are 
consequences for violating those expectations. While there might be general expectations that 
people behave respectfully and considerately in public spaces, the child in this example would not 
generally be viewed as responsible for upholding them yet, which explains the apparent 
inappropriateness of his being held responsible by the restaurant staff or other strangers.27 Until he 
is able to appreciate and uphold those general expectations, he is only responsible for upholding 
relationship-based norms in this domain.28  
When parents hold their children responsible, this often serves an educative function.29 More 
                                                        
27 This is not to say that children, or marginal agents more generally, are only subject to relationship-
based norms. Rather, in domains where they are impaired or immature, some general norms may be 
offline, though they may be subject to relationship-based norms with overlapping (though perhaps 
less demanding) content. 
 
28 The term ‘relationship-based norms’ is derived from ‘relationship-dependent norms,’ which was 
introduced by Macalester Bell in “The Standing to Blame: A Critique” in order to explain how 
“blame’s moral propriety sometimes depends on the relationship between the blamer and the target 
[of blame]” without invoking the notion of standing, which she finds problematic (Bell 265). In the 
development of this notion, I am strongly indebted to her. 
 
29 Saying that our responsibility responses to children serve an educative function does not preclude 
them from being genuine instances of holding responsible. Though moral education is an important 
part of childrearing, it is not as though our moral education stops once we become adults. Holding 
anyone responsible, regardless of their maturity, can be a way of drawing their attention to important 
considerations they may be unaware of or have otherwise overlooked. This point is of a piece with 
the view that blame paradigmatically serves a communicative function. For one statement of this 
view, see Fricker (2016). 
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specifically, it is a way of modeling important aspects of the norms of the wider moral community, 
both in terms of their content and what happens when they are violated. This allows children to 
learn what constitutes making a moral mistake, and the consequences that particular mistake would 
have for their interpersonal relationships. But it also insulates children from overly harsh treatment 
while they are learning how they are supposed to behave, how to control themselves, and how their 
behavior affects others.  
An analogous point can be made about Noon Somewhere. The reason why the therapist 
should hold the alcoholic responsible for showing up intoxicated is that their relationship is partially 
constituted by certain expectations about how both parties ought to behave. Some of those 
expectations would be a part of all relationships that are genuinely therapeutic. For example, a 
therapist must have some hope that her patient can recover, and the patient must make a good faith 
effort to attain recovery (which would presumably include showing up to appointments sober). 
Other expectations that are part of therapeutic relationships will be more specific, and ideally, they 
will be established as a result of the patient’s desired aims for treatment and the therapist’s judgment 
about what is necessary and realistic in order for her to achieve those aims. In contrast, the 
relationship between the acquaintance and the alcoholic is currently fairly distant and unstructured, 
and consequently it is not a source of relationship-based norms in the same way.30 An attentive 
acquaintance might be bothered by his alcoholic colleague’s behavior at their meeting, but would 
also recognize that this same behavior indicates that something is seriously wrong with his colleague. 
He should therefore, at the very least, hesitate about whether to hold his alcoholic colleague 
                                                        
 
30 The point here is not that only a therapist could hold the alcoholic responsible for being sober at 
social engagements, but that relationship-based norms give relationships a certain structure, and 
therefore they tend to require a level of intimacy that is not had between strangers or acquaintances. 
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responsible, given both this evidence that his colleague is impaired, and given that they are only 
acquaintances. By entering into therapy, however, the alcoholic has thereby created a relationship 
that is intended to be a source of norms about his drinking, and therefore his therapist can (and 
ordinarily should) hold him responsible for attending their appointments sober.31  
When therapists hold their patients responsible, this serves a number of important functions. 
For example, most patients know about what norms people are generally expected to uphold as a 
member of the moral community, but may be unsure whether or not they’re capable of living up to 
them; the role of the therapist is to facilitate growth in this latter arena, and thereby help those 
patients reintegrate into the community. Depending on the duration and severity of their illness, 
psychiatric patients may have very strong inductive evidence that they can’t do what they must to 
avoid running afoul of what is expected of them. At least for many, those expectations seem so 
demanding that they lack the consistent motivation or self-control to do what they might 
acknowledge they should. As Flanagan writes in a discussion of identity and addiction,  
“Alcoholics and drug addicts often speak about no longer being themselves, of having lost 
their way, and loved ones, friends, the law, and the mental health community typically agree. 
The adult addict is physically continuous with some particular baby born years before, and 
they have an autobiographical memory of that particular individual life. Metaphysically 
speaking, the addict is the same person they always were.  But they are no longer the person 
they planned, hoped, or expected to be, or who others expected them to be. The kind of 
identity they have lost or are in danger of losing is the kind of identity that comes from 
executing authorial power to align, keep aligned, and then continually recalibrate one’s actual 
life in terms of one’s vision of the good” (Flanagan 77). 
 
One of the aims of holding addicts responsible in the context of psychotherapy, then, is to restore 
that authorial power and its connection to the addict’s identity.  
                                                        
31 A proponent of the notion of standing to blame might insist that a more proximate explanation 
here is that the alcoholic’s drinking is his therapist’s business, and not the acquaintance’s. But even if 
the alcoholic’s drinking is generally not the acquaintance’s business, his drunkenness at their meeting 
surely is, so this cannot explain the difference between the two cases.   
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But what is it about therapeutic relationships that makes it possible for therapists to facilitate 
that restoration? More generally, what do the kind of relationships in which it makes sense to hold 
marginal agents responsible have in common? So far, I have primarily talked about parents holding 
their children responsible and therapists holding their patients responsible, but I do not mean to 
suggest that caregiving relationships are the only ones in which one could appropriately hold 
marginal agents responsible, or the only kinds of relationships that could be sources of norms. 
They are, however, paradigm instances of a broader range of close relationships. Close 
relationships are ones where the members tend to care especially about each other’s approval, and 
where the parties in question have the authority to expect each other to act in accordance with their 
values, as individuals or as members of the relationship. The importance of relationships to 
responsibility may be especially obvious when responsible agents are also impaired or immature. For 
better or for worse, children can’t raise themselves, and people with psychiatric issues who enter into 
therapy thereby acknowledge that they’d be better off not going it alone. But all of us participate in 
close relationships that are partially constituted by relationship-based norms. Consider, for example, 
the norms that people stipulate in the context of their romantic relationships about how frequently 
they communicate, or who will perform various domestic tasks, or how they will raise their children. 
That said, relationship-based norms play a more obvious role in marginal agents’ lives because some 
of the expectations that we usually hold of people may need to be adjusted in light of their deficits, 
and it is especially important for there to be a good fit between one’s responsibility responses to 
them and their capacities.32  
                                                        
32 This point is nicely made with respect to children by Tamar Schapiro in her paper, “What Is a 
Child?” She argues that childhood is a normative predicament that children have to be guided out of 
in order to become autonomous, where this guidance involves sensitivity to their present capacities 
as well as acknowledgement that they will develop over time. As she writes, “Some readers have 
worried that the view I am putting forth implies that we ought to force children to take on adult 
responsibilities as early as possible, to ‘throw them in the deep end,’ as it were. But when a child (or 
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iii. Explaining the cases at hand 
Now, let us consider how the relationship-based norms view accounts for the three features 
of our practices of holding marginal agents responsible that I’ve discussed so far. The first such 
feature is that the content of the norms to which marginal agents are subject sometimes differs from 
the norms we generally expect psychologically normal adults to uphold. To revisit Sunday Brunch, 
though a parent might have a normative expectation that her five-year-old child not scream in a 
restaurant solely because he’s bored, she might not have a similar expectation that he shouldn’t 
scream if he burns his tongue on hot soup, whereas this is presumably something we expect of most 
adults. My explanation for this feature is as follows: Relationship-based norms aim to be sensitive to 
the capacities of the agents in those relationships, and to reflect the understanding both parties in 
the relationship have of each other. The conditions that make specific persons count as marginal 
agents present obstacles to their meeting the demands of the moral community in those domains 
where they are impaired. Most five-year-olds, for example, find it quite difficult to control 
themselves, and the fact that they are in a public space won’t prevent them from yelping if they are 
in pain.  
That said, the content of relationship-based norms doesn’t always differ in this way. In the 
example we’ve just considered, the parent has established a norm that her five-year-old shouldn’t 
scream in the restaurant when he is bored. This may well be more difficult for a typical five-year-old 
than it would be for most adults, but it is presumably a reasonable expectation for both. Moreover, 
given the role that holding marginal agents responsible plays in their growth and development, it 
                                                        
any person, for that matter) is forced to perform tasks which are overly demanding given her 
abilities, this tends merely to reinforce her sense of her own dependence and powerlessness. 
Children should be given tasks which are challenging yet tractable, tasks which allow them to feel 
pleasure in their own achievement of mastery” (Schapiro 737).  
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makes perfect sense that the norms they are responsible for upholding share some of their content 
with those to which psychologically normal adults are subject.  
The relationship-based norms view accounts for the second feature of our practices, namely 
that the character of responsibility responses towards marginal agents may differ from how we 
would hold psychologically normal adults responsible, along similar lines. With both children and 
addicts, there is a recognition that the condition that makes them count as marginal agents also 
makes living up to certain expectations of the wider community especially difficult, whether due to 
emotional distress or a developing understanding of those expectations. Appropriate responsibility 
responses to these individuals take those considerations into account, and may therefore take on a 
different (e.g., less angry) tone. 
Finally, the relationship-based norm view’s explanation for the third feature of our practices, 
namely that one’s relationship to a given marginal agent matters with respect to whether or not it is 
appropriate for one to hold her responsible is, at a very general level, trivial. After all, what 
distinguishes this view from alternatives is primarily that it explains some of our responsibility 
responses in terms of expectations built up (i.e., norms established) in the context of particular 
relationships. Nonetheless, it is less trivial to determine which relationships are sources of norms of 
this kind, and when agents are subject to them.33 I have suggested that a special concern for the 
good opinion of the other party and a shared evaluative perspective characterize relationships that 
are sources of norms.34  
                                                        
33 This uncertainty about whether or not a relationship-based norm holds between particular parties 
could serve as an alternative explanation for what Shoemaker calls our ambivalence with respect to 
the responsibility of marginal agents that does not require his three senses of responsibility. 
 
34 By “shared evaluative perspective,” I do not mean that both parties have one unified set of values, 
but rather that they encourage each other to live up to their values (as individuals and as members of 
the relationship).  
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The other views I have considered all take it for granted that there is such a thing as being a 
responsible agent, and that agents attain this status solely in light of capacities internal to them. The 
examples we have considered cast doubt on this assumption. On the pretense view, marginal agents 
lack the capacities required to be responsible, and therefore holding them responsible must be a 
matter of pretense. On the degrees of responsibility view, the fact that marginal agents have deficits 
in the capacities required for responsible agency (e.g., normative competence on Tiboris’ view) is 
what explains their diminished responsibility. On Shoemaker’s tripartite view of responsibility, 
marginal agents are likewise responsible in some senses but not others in virtue of the state of their 
internal capacities (in particular, their capacities for having and expressing a deep self, their ability to 
answer for their actions, and their regard for others). On all these views, moreover, the justification 
for holding someone responsible is determined by the extent to which they have these capacities. 
The relationship-based norms view offers an alternative conception of responsibility. On 
this view, whether one counts as responsible, and whether someone is entitled to hold one 
responsible, is a relational matter all the way down. In order to be sensitive to norms at all, agents 
must have certain capacities, but those capacities are substantially more minimal than philosophers 
typically appreciate. Moreover, the norms themselves, which derive their significance from 
interpersonal relationships and communities, are also necessary for responsibility. For example, the 
child is responsible to his parent for not screaming in the restaurant, and the parent is entitled to 
hold her child responsible for this, because of a norm that holds between them, and not simply 
because of the child’s ability to do what that norm requires. In this example, the child is responsible 
full stop – not pretend-responsible, or responsible to a degree. Similarly, I may be responsible to my 
partner, and he may be entitled to hold me responsible, for communicating every day when one of 
us is traveling, if there is a norm like this between us. Our relationships are foundational to 
responsibility, not only in bringing us up in the moral community, but in continuing to be sources of 
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norms throughout our lives; we cannot be responsible by ourselves.35  
4. Conclusion 
Friendships (as well as parent-child relationships, romantic relationships, and so on) vary 
quite a bit from each other, and therefore relationship-based norms take on a variety of different 
forms. At the most general level, these norms seem to fulfill two roles: First, relationship-based 
norms allow the parties in a particular relationship to establish how they want to be with each other. 
In this role, relationship-based norms concern matters that are strictly internal to a particular 
relationship (e.g., who takes out the trash, whether you and your friend text or talk on the phone). 
Many of these matters are quite mundane, although they can also be weightier (e.g., establishing 
what fidelity requires for you and your romantic partner). Regardless, establishing norms that are 
appropriate for a particular relationship partially constitutes the relationship itself.  
Second, relationship-based norms sometimes concern matters in the wider community, 
where the relationship is such that the parties can motivate each other to act and feel in certain ways 
in response to each other’s expectations. Relationship-based norms that play this second role also 
apply to marginal and non-marginal agents alike. Sometimes these norms arise because agents are 
impaired or immature, and sometimes they simply reflect the authority that our kith and kin have to 
hold us accountable for acting in accordance with our values. For example, if I tell a friend that I 
intend to be an ethical vegetarian from now on, she has grounds to hold me responsible if she finds 
me eating meat that strangers or acquaintances would presumably lack.36 
                                                        
35 My claim here is not that the capacities of individual agents are utterly irrelevant to responsibility, 
but rather that their relevance is always mediated by social considerations. Responsibility is 
something that both emerges (in a developmental sense) interpersonally, and is a function of norms 
that derive their significance from interpersonal communities. 
36 It might be the case that strangers or acquaintances would have some grounds to hold me 
responsible for eating meat if it is morally obligatory for me to abstain from doing so. However, 
these are not the same grounds that my friend has on the basis of my telling her about my ethical 
commitment. 
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The claim that marginal agents, including children, are subject to relationship-based norms in 
domains where they are impaired or still developing suggests a way of understanding the apparent 
plausibility of the degrees of responsibility view. On my view, our responsibility responses to 
marginal agents are modified in ways that reflect the difficulties they face in living up to some of the 
demands of the moral community.37  Rather than concluding on this basis that marginal agents are 
responsible, but to a lesser degree, I’ve invited us to notice that there are particular relationships in 
which marginal agents rely on others to help them navigate and resolve these difficulties. In the 
context of these relationships, I have argued, marginal agents are appropriately held responsible. 
Still, one might wonder where this leaves us with respect to the question of whether and to 
what extent marginal agents genuinely are responsible. After all, I haven’t denied that marginal 
agents have genuine deficits that, at least for the time being, affect what they are capable of and the 
expectations to which they are reasonably subject. Why should we think of my view, that stresses the 
importance of relationships, as a competitor to the degrees of responsibility view rather than a 
variation of it? I am not fundamentally objecting to the claim that there are degrees of responsibility 
(or indeed, that there can be pretense in our social practices of holding people responsible). I am 
objecting to these views as explanations for how we hold marginal agents responsible in ordinary 
life. I have tried to show that these practices put pressure on any view of responsibility that 
characterizes it as a property of individual agents, possessed entirely in virtue of one’s psychological 
capacities (e.g., rationality and self-control). For marginal and paradigm responsible agents alike, on 
my view, responsibility is always responsibility to someone. As such, the deficits that marginal agents 
                                                        
 
37 This explains in part why good parenting is so important. As Schapiro writes, “Being a practical 
agent is hard enough; being an undeveloped one is even harder. Our conduct toward children 
should express this attitude; it should reflect an appreciation of the additional challenge children face 
in deciding what to do and what to say” (Schapiro 735).  
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have do not thereby mean they are responsible to a lesser degree, or only pretend-responsible.  
I have suggested that to be responsible in some domain is to be subject to norms in that 
domain, and marginal agents are clearly subject to norms. The child in Sunday Brunch is responsible 
for not yelling in the restaurant when he’s bored, and that is because he is subject to a relationship-
based norm with his parent that establishes that expectation for him. Similarly, the alcoholic in 
Noon Somewhere is responsible for showing up to therapy sober because of a relationship-based 
norm with his therapist. Paradigm responsible agents are likewise subject to relationship-based 
norms in some of their relationships.  
Admittedly, there remain questions about what precisely is involved in being subject to a 
relationship-based norm, and to what extent those norms are continuous with other kinds of norms 
and obligations.38 But we can see how responsibility theorists must address these sorts of questions 
about the relational features of responsibility in order to fully understand our social practices of 
holding people responsible. Careful attention to these practices brings the notion of having 
responsibilities to other people closer to the notion of being responsible than existing accounts of 
responsibility typically have.39 We can be responsible in virtue of expectations that are established in 
the context of specific relationships or communities, as is evidenced by the cases involving marginal 
agents I’ve discussed.  
I began by noting that much of the philosophical literature about responsibility addresses the 
question of what it takes for an agent to be responsible. I have argued that we should instead be 
                                                        
38 By saying that responsibility is always responsibility to someone, I am not committing myself to 
the view that all norms to which agents are subject are relationship-based norms. I agree with 
Wallace (2011), for example, that “Moral requirements may be understood as relationship-constituting, 
but they are not relationship-based” (Wallace (2011) 363, emphasis in original). 
39 Because my conception of responsibility is relational, when I refer to the question of whether an 
agent is responsible, this is essentially shorthand for whether the agent is capable of being 
responsible to anyone for anything.   
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asking what it takes for an agent to be responsible to someone for something. If we address 
questions about relational phenomena solely by considering individuals, we will arrive at answers 
that are incomplete at best. Attempting to understand being responsible as something we are by 
ourselves limits and thereby distorts our understanding of who is capable of responsible agency. 
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Relationships as Sources of Norms 
 
1. Introduction 
Standard theoretical accounts of responsibility often identify being responsible with having 
certain capacities such as rationality and self-control.40 On this view, any agent in possession of the 
requisite capacities is therefore responsible and can therefore be appropriately held responsible for 
what they do.41 Viewing responsibility in this way has made it possible for philosophers to overlook 
not only how so-called “marginal agents” can be responsible, as I argued in the previous chapter, but 
how all of us become responsible and are held responsible in virtue of norms that arise 
interpersonally. 
Careful consideration of our social practices of holding people responsible, however, brings 
to light how essential norms are to responsibility. I have argued that the core of holding someone 
responsible is regarding her as accountable for upholding a norm. I have also suggested, though not 
yet fully argued for, the claim that this has consequences not only for when individuals are 
appropriately held responsible, but also when they genuinely are responsible. In particular, I claim 
that to be responsible in some domain is to be subject to norms in that domain. I take myself to 
have shown that marginal agents are subject to norms in relationships they have with their parents, 
caregivers, friends, employers, and so on. In the context of these relationships and the norms that 
                                                        
40 For a range of views that endorse this general picture, see Wallace (1994), Korsgaard (1996b), and 
Shoemaker (2015), among others. 
 
41 Of course, even responsible agents in this sense can be excused from being held responsible for 
particular actions if certain conditions obtain (e.g., they were ignorant of what they were doing, or 
under great strain). Still, the general picture is one in which the presence of these capacities both 
makes the agent in question responsible and justifies others holding him responsible. 
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arise out of them, it is perfectly ordinary and appropriate for these agents to be held responsible, 
despite the fact that they may exhibit significant deficits in some of the cognitive and volitional 
capacities typically associated with responsible agency. They are called into responsible agency by 
those with whom they are in relationships.42  
Ultimately, I want to show that we are all called into responsible agency in this way. We all 
begin to learn what it means to be responsible, how to be responsible, and what we are responsible 
for, from our parents and other caregivers who set normative expectations for us.43 For example, 
children learn that they are responsible for being considerate of others in public spaces, or for 
sharing with their friends, by being accountable to their parents for these behaviors. Over time, we 
typically come to internalize these expectations such that their force no longer depends on any 
particular relationship. Still, it is important to remember that this was not always the case. Moreover, 
as adults, entering into a relationship with someone inevitably involves having to navigate and create 
expectations for each other’s behavior, where some of these expectations are also relationship-based 
norms. By this, I mean that in many of our relationships, we create normative expectations with the 
other party in that relationship that we do not have towards other persons in general. Sometimes 
these norms concern matters that are strictly internal to the relationship, such as how frequently you 
and the other person communicate.  
There are also relationship-based norms that concern how paradigm responsible agents (i.e., 
psychologically normal adult persons) behave in the wider community. Sometimes these norms arise 
because agents that are not considered marginal agents may still have localized impairments that 
                                                        
42 This language about being called into responsible agency is influenced by Hilde Lindemann’s 
discussion of being called into personhood in her book, Holding and Letting Go: The Social Practice of 
Personal Identities. 
 
43 By normative expectations, I mean expectations that someone should be or act in a particular way, 
rather than predictions that they will in fact be or act that way.  
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present obstacles in their lives. In such circumstances, their relationships can be sources of norms 
that ameliorate the negative consequences of these impairments. In addition, sometimes 
relationship-based norms concern how paradigm responsible agents behave in the wider community 
even when there is no such impairment. These norms reflect the ways that the parties in question 
expect each other to act in accordance with their values, either as individuals or as a member of the 
relationship. In general, relationship-based norms constitute ways all of us are accountable to those 
with whom we are in relationships.  
This way of conceptualizing responsibility has two important consequences: First, 
relationships are fundamental to responsibility in a way that has been underappreciated. On my 
view, there is no such thing as holding someone responsible in the absence of a norm that she is 
accountable for upholding. Our relationships are the original source of these norms in childhood 
and continue to be sources of norms throughout our lives. Second, marginal and non-marginal 
agents are responsible in the same sense, namely that they are accountable to others in virtue of 
norms. This does not settle the question of what precisely individual agents are responsible for, or 
what kind of responses from others count as the enforcement of these norms. But my view of what 
it means to be responsible suggests a continuity between the development our agency must undergo 
as we reach adulthood, and the changes it continues to undergo as a result of our continued 
engagement with others. Similarly, my view of holding responsible identifies a common core 
between a parent’s giving her child a “time out” and the interpersonal expressions of resentment and 
indignation that are commonly identified with holding responsible, which I take to be reflected in 
everyday life. We must all be taught what it means to be responsible and be held responsible, not 
only in terms of how to behave ourselves, but in terms of our understanding of what it means to be 
accountable to others. This understanding continues to change as our relationships themselves 
change.  
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In this chapter, I would like to develop the notion of relationship-based norms in more 
detail. I will proceed as follows: First, I will explain and offer examples of how these norms give 
relationships structure by determining what the parties in question expect specifically of each other, 
both concerning matters internal to the relationship and in the wider community. Some of these 
examples will concern agents who are impaired, and there I will focus on how relationship-based 
norms serve to mitigate some of the negative consequences of these impairments and allow us to 
understand these agents as genuinely responsible. But I will also discuss a variety of examples of 
relationship-based norms that have nothing to do with impairment. In addition, I will address the 
question of how relationship-based norms relate to norms that are generally thought to apply to all 
persons, including moral norms. Finally, I will discuss how the way I understand relationships as 
fundamental to responsibility intersects with other philosophical literature aimed at addressing 
relational aspects of responsibility, including the notions of special obligations and proleptic blame.  
2. Becoming Responsible to Others 
It is widely recognized that one is not born a responsible agent, but rather becomes one. The 
body of literature on this process, both philosophical and empirical, is too large and diverse for me 
to summarize in full. But I would like to offer a kind of developmental story about responsibility 
here, one which brings out the centrality of our relationships to what it means to be responsible. In 
order to do this, I would like to focus especially on two capacities relevant to responsibility that 
begin to emerge in early childhood: the capacity for empathy and the capacity to understand and be 
sensitive to norms. 
2a. The Beginning 
In “Moral Development and Moral Responsibility,” Susan Dwyer writes,  
“a considerable amount of data has accumulated demonstrating that very young children, 
within the first year of life, manifest a range of pro-social behaviors, like helping, comforting, 
and sharing. The prevailing hypothesis about the psychological substrate of these pro-social 
behaviors is that human beings are innately empathic, built to respond spontaneously to the 
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distress of con-specifics. Martin Hoffman provides a description of empathy as developing 
from a primitive sort of emotional contagion (babies are apt to cry when other babies cry) to 
the detached, reflective acknowledgment of others' pain and suffering that characterizes 
mature adults” (Dwyer 188). 
 
Thus, children generally exhibit some degree of empathy very early on, but it is important not to 
over-interpret this empathy as revealing a robust understanding of other people’s emotional lives. As 
psychologist Alison Gopnik writes, “Empathy is rooted in intimacy, but genuine moral reasoning 
requires us to go beyond these intuitive and immediate responses to those we love. Early empathy 
depends on close personal contact—the kind of contact that lets us actually see the grief or joy on 
someone’s face. It’s part of the intense intimacy of caregivers and babies — as close and profound 
an intimacy as we humans ever feel” (Gopnik 216). As children develop, they begin to understand 
themselves as separate from others, and expand their sense of empathy beyond their most intimate 
relationships. 
Children also exhibit the capacity to be sensitive to norms beginning around the age of two. 
More surprisingly, a number of studies suggest that toddlers are capable of discerning differences 
between moral and conventional rules. As Dwyer writes in summarizing these studies, 
“Preschool children discriminate between moral transgressions (e.g., stealing a pencil, 
pushing someone off a swing) and transgressions of non-moral rules (e.g., wearing pajamas 
to school)…[C]hildren's spontaneous reactions to transgressions of each type differ: they are 
more likely to initiate physical responses to actors who have broken a moral rule than to 
those who have broken a conventional rule…Children [also] offer different types of verbal 
responses to various transgressions: in the case of a moral transgression children will advert 
to the pain and injury experienced by the victim of an act and they will often employ the 
language of rights and fairness; whereas in the case of non-moral transgressions, children are 
inclined to focus on issues of social order and disorder, and on the explicit commands of 
their caretakers or teachers…[Finally,] children differentially modify their judgments of an 
action's permissibility when told that an authority figure has lifted a prohibition. Such a 
change affects judgments about conventional transgressions (if the teacher says it is okay to 
wear pajamas to school, children agree), but do not affect judgments about moral 
transgressions (if the teacher says it is okay to steal someone's eraser, children continue to 
judge the action impermissible)” (Dwyer 188-9). 
 
Thus, we can see how even very young children have emotional responses to the feelings of 
those around them, and are both sensitive to norms and capable of making at least some judgments 
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about their authority. Before children are fully capable of assessing these norms and making up their 
own minds about them, however, they may obey them because they are issued in the context of their 
intimate relationships, particularly their relationships with primary caregivers. As Rawls writes in 
describing what he calls “the morality of authority,”  
“If…[a child]…loves and trusts his parents, he will tend to accept their injunctions. He will 
also strive to be like them, assuming that they are indeed worthy of esteem and adhere to the 
precepts which they enjoin…The child, therefore, accepts their judgment of him and he will 
be inclined to judge himself as they do when he violates their injunctions. At the same time, 
of course, his desires exceed the bonds of what is permitted, for otherwise there would be 
no need for these precepts. Thus parental norms are experienced as constraints and the child 
may rebel against them…Yet if he does love and trust his parents, then, once he has given in 
to temptation, he is disposed to share their attitude toward his misdemeanors” (Rawls 407). 
 
This acceptance of parental norms and attitudes is a vital part of children’s enculturation into the 
wider community. As they get older, Rawls suggests, they go on to embrace standards that come 
from their roles within their family and other social groups. This stage of development requires 
children to appreciate a wider variety of norms and perspectives about what is required of them. 
Eventually, we come to appreciate not just the content of the norms themselves, but also have a 
deeper grasp of their justification. We develop our normative and agential competences by being 
subject to norms and being held responsible in virtue of these norms. In the beginning, our intimate 
relationships are the sole source of these norms, and these relationships continue to be an important 
source of norms throughout our lives. 
To revisit an example from the previous chapter, consider the five-year-old’s behavior in the 
restaurant. His mother has established a norm with him that he not scream in a restaurant because 
he is bored. She holds him responsible for upholding this norm when she reminds him about the 
use of inside voices or says that if he behaves himself, they can leave soon. I argued previously that 
this norm is relationship-based, as evidenced by the impropriety of strangers or acquaintances 
holding the child responsible for his screaming. But this norm has content that overlaps with a 
broader norm most of us regard ourselves as responsible for upholding, namely that we ought to be 
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considerate of others in public spaces; otherwise, we are liable to their blame or criticism. For 
psychologically normal adults, this norm is general rather than relationship-based. That is, we regard 
ourselves as accountable for being considerate in this way to everyone, unlike the child in this 
example who understands his abstaining from screaming when he is bored as perhaps only 
something he owes to his mother, because of a norm created in their relationship.44 
Many relationship-based norms, especially those to which children are subject in their 
development, have content that is related to general norms. Thus, relationship-based norms can help 
to facilitate moral and agential development by introducing expectations in the context of an 
intimate relationship, which helps them to be communicated in a manner that is fitting to the agent 
in question. In other words, relationship-based norms are meant to be sensitive to the capacities of 
the relevant agents to live up to them. This means that sometimes these norms have less demanding 
content than they would have if the agent was psychologically better off or further along in their 
development. As I said earlier, the mother in this example might expect her five-year-old not to 
scream simply because he is bored, but not similarly to expect him to use “inside voices” when he 
burns his tongue on hot soup. Let us imagine, then, that the norm between them is that the child 
must abstain from screaming when he is in public places unless he is hurt or in danger, or he will be 
liable to a “time out” or a reminder about inside voices. Though we expect most adults to avoid 
screaming when they burn their tongues, five-year-olds generally (and let’s presume, this one in 
                                                        
44 To say that a norm is relationship-based requires that the norm is created in a token relationship 
and that members of that relationship have an authority to enforce it that others lack. (I address this 
point further in Section 3.) But whether an individual who is subject to a relationship-based norm 
regards it as obligation owed to the other party in the relationship is a separate matter. This is 
particularly evident in therapeutic contexts, where therapists might create norms with their patients 
aimed at promoting the patient’s wellbeing. Though the patient might view their relationship as a 
source of norms, she might not conceive of herself as owing it to her therapist to uphold these 
expectations. 
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particular), have considerable difficulty controlling their emotions, a difficulty that will dissipate as 
they mature.45  
For all of us, our understanding that we are accountable for being considerate of others in 
public spaces begins with norms that arise in our intimate relationships, such as those we have with 
our parents as children. Over time, the norms that we learn in childhood may be internalized such 
that they shed their ties to the relationship that was their source, or they may be revised or rejected. 
Still, these relationships were the original source of our responsibilities in a wide variety of domains. 
2b. The Rest of Our Lives 
In addition to contributing to children’s moral and agential development, relationship-based 
norms continue to have an important role in our responsibility practices throughout our lives. This is 
not entirely surprising. As Victoria McGeer writes,  
“All human beings are relatively helpless in their newborn state, depending on others not 
just for their current wellbeing, but for their developmental wellbeing in the following sense: 
Caregivers provide the kind of meaning and structure that makes sense of infants’ early 
attempts at intentional behaviour, bootstrapping such behaviour into coherent routines that 
infants come to understand and own as part and parcel of their agential competence. This 
bootstrapping process, known as ‘parental scaffolding’ [Bruner 1983], continues throughout 
early development, with caretakers enabling their children to attempt and master 
progressively more complicated and creatively elaborated activities in part by motivating 
them through communicating, in both words and deeds, a hopeful vision of what their 
children can be or do. Thus, we human beings come into our own as agents, initially through 
depending on the hopeful scaffolding of others. So it should be no surprise that, despite the 
ways in which good external scaffolding must change over developmental time, we—who 
carry our developmental heritage within us—continue to derive motivational energy for 
pursuing and developing our own powers of agency in consequence of others’ hopes for us.” 
(McGeer 249).  
 
                                                        
45 Relationship-based norms may, though need not, have content that is different from general 
norms that one is responsible to the wider community for upholding (e.g., by being less demanding). 
But what makes a norm relationship-based is not its content. For more on this point, see section 3.  
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In this sense, we may continue to develop our agency as adults in response to our social 
environment, and in particular our relationships. Moreover, relationship-based norms represent ways 
we are accountable to others beyond expectations that contribute to our agential development. 
As I gestured at earlier, relationship-based norms have two distinct roles: First, they give 
relationships structure by serving as parameters for how the parties in the relationship want to be 
with each other. There are many legitimate ways to be someone’s friend, for example, and therefore 
many permissible answers to the question of what one should expect from others in virtue of being 
friends with them. In this role, relationship-based norms have content that concerns matters that are 
strictly internal to the relationship. Therefore, let’s call this the internal role. In order to illustrate this 
role, consider how entering into a new romantic relationship often involves negotiating boundaries 
and expectations as the relationship takes shape. In particular, one might create a norm with one’s 
new partner about how frequently you communicate – say, for example, that you’ll be in touch by 
phone most days that you don’t see each other. This norm both arises in this particular relationship 
and is only enforceable by the other party in that relationship. It is something that informs the shape 
of that partnership – a backdrop against which not hearing from each other for a while could be 
alarming or perhaps even blameworthy depending on the circumstances. 
Second, relationship-based norms sometimes concern matters in the wider community, 
where the relationship is such that the parties are capable of motivating each other to act and feel in 
certain ways in response to each other’s expectations. So, let’s call this the motivational role.46 
Sometimes, these norms arise because one or both of the agents in the relationship is impaired in 
                                                        
46 Of course, we are also motivated by those with whom we are in relationships to uphold internal 
relationship-based norms. The descriptor “motivational” for this second role is not meant to rule 
that out, but rather to bring out how our interpersonal relationships can have a powerful influence 
on our behavior in the wider community. 
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such a way that they may have difficulty satisfying the general norms to which most people in the 
community are considered accountable.47 In this role, relationship-based norms serve to ameliorate 
the effects of these impairments on the wider community; one is motivated by the other party in the 
relationship to satisfy a modified version of what others consider a general norm, or to otherwise do 
one’s best in that domain. The norm that the mother has with her child about screaming in the 
restaurant plays just this role. 
Paradigm responsible agents sometimes have relevantly similar impairments – that is, those 
that call for an adjustment in what is expected of them. In a previous chapter, I gave an example 
involving someone who is grieving and having a difficult time doing their job as a result. Consider a 
variant on this case, in which your husband’s mother has recently passed away. They were very close 
and he is heartbroken, so much so that he is having difficulty being productive while at work. His 
boss knows of his recent loss and wants to give him space to grieve, but as time elapses, her concern 
becomes coupled with frustration. She is unsure about whether and how to express this frustration 
exactly, and therefore she doesn’t.  When your husband tells you about the difficulties he’s been 
having at work, you are also both concerned and frustrated. You know how hard things are for him 
right now, but you also know that they will only get harder if he is fired. You ask him if there are 
additional ways you can support him at home, but also insist that he needs to do whatever it takes to 
keep his job. He agrees with you, and so you begin to ask him more frequently about how things are 
going at work. It seems as though the nature of your relationship with your husband is essential to 
understanding why you especially are permitted to hold him responsible if he continues to be 
                                                        
47 This is not to suggest that there is one set of general norms that everyone in the community is 
subject to, and those agents who are impaired or immature are subject to a proper subset of those 
norms. What general norms we are subject to is partly a function of the communities that we belong 
to, and our roles within those communities, and so will vary from person to person. That said, there 
are some norms that apply to the majority of persons within a community, and those norms may be 
offline (either temporarily or permanently) for immature and impaired agents.  
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unproductive at work in ways that perhaps even his boss should not, but in this case the norm does 
not concern your husband’s behavior towards you, but at the office.  
Similarly, suppose you have a friend who is extremely frank with others to the extent that he 
often makes people uncomfortable. You know he is well-intentioned and wants to improve in this 
arena, but you are often embarrassed and uncomfortable yourself when this happens. You might 
create a norm in your relationship that when your friend says something that is offensive in this way, 
you have a conversation about it so that he can appreciate what was problematic about what he said. 
In other words, this norm makes you and your friend accountable to each other to give and receive 
feedback about the way he interacts with others.  
In addition to this, some relationship-based norms that play this motivational role are not 
responses to impairments at all. Rather, these norms reflect the special authority that those with 
whom we are in relationships have to hold us accountable for acting in accordance with our values, 
either as individuals or as a member of the relationship. Again, marginal and paradigm responsible 
agents alike are subject to such norms. Consider how a parent might hold her child responsible for 
continuing to play a sport or a musical instrument that the child genuinely enjoys but is finding 
challenging at the moment, or how friends who volunteer together at a soup kitchen might hold 
each other responsible for volunteering consistently.  
Macalester Bell describes another example where there is a norm of this kind when she 
writes,  
“Two old friends from art school may hold one another to standards of artistic integrity, 
even though it may be inappropriate for others to hold them to these standards. What makes 
it appropriate for the friends to hold one another to these standards is that their relationship 
is partially constituted by norms concerning artistic excellence… If a casual acquaintance 
were to blame one of the artists for lacking artistic integrity, the artist could reasonably reply 
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that the criticizer is not in a position to blame him for this fault even if he has in fact 
compromised his artistic integrity” (Bell 277-8). 48, 49 
 
My aim in this section has been to motivate the thought that relationship-based norms are 
vital to the development of responsible agency, and that we continue to be responsible and be held 
responsible partly in virtue of these norms throughout our lives. There remain further questions, 
however, about the precise structure of relationship-based norms, and how they relate to general 
norms (i.e., norms whose source does not lie in any particular relationship). I will turn to these 
questions next. 
3. The Nature and Scope of Relationship-Based Norms 
 
As I understand them, norms in general have five important aspects: (1) their content, (2) 
their source, (3) who is entitled to enforce the norm, (4) the range of consequences (both emotional 
and behavioral) that will result when one upholds or violates the norm, (5) and a specification of the 
circumstances that would make it inappropriate to enforce the norm. The content of a norm is a 
description of the expectation in question (e.g., that one clean up one’s room, or be considerate of 
others in public spaces). Its source is, in other words, where the norm comes from (e.g., a particular 
parent-child relationship).50 Norms also vary in terms of who is entitled to enforce them, what forms 
that enforcement might take, and the considerations that might make it inappropriate to enforce 
                                                        
48 As I interpret this example, what Bell is suggesting is that these old friends from art school have 
made it the case that their relationship is partially constituted by norms concerning artistic excellence 
– that is, that the relationship in question is the source of these norms.   
 
49 In fact, Bell uses this example to introduce the notion of “relationship-dependent norms,” to 
which my discussion of “relationship-based norms” owes a great deal. 
 
50 In the case of relationship-based norms, their source is always some particular relationship. In 
contrast, general norms are typically not created by any particular individual or in any token 
relationship. Moral norms are one kind of general norm, and there are a variety of metaethical views 
about precisely what their source is. To decide amongst these views falls outside the scope of my 
project. My suggestion here is only that some norms (specifically, relationship-based norms) have 
their source in particular relationships, and others do not.  
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them (e.g., that the individual who has violated the norm is sick). Relationship-based norms, as 
distinguished from general norms, satisfy two conditions: first, that they are created within the 
context of a particular relationship (i.e., they have their source in a relationship) and are only 
enforceable by parties in that relationship.  
Whether a norm is relationship-based, then, is not a function of its content. While norms 
whose function is to give a relationship structure (i.e., those that play the internal role discussed 
above) are only intelligible as relationship-based norms, there are many relationship-based norms 
that have overlapping content with general norms, including moral norms. I will address each of 
these points in turn. Relationship-based norms which play the internal role I have identified are 
related to the fact that relationships involve a number of coordination problems, and that each 
relationship will involve its own, idiosyncratic set of solutions to those problems. For example, when 
I moved and was no longer geographically close to some of my friends, we had to work out how we 
would communicate from then on. My friends and I created norms (sometimes explicitly, sometimes 
less so) about whether we would text or talk on the phone, and roughly how often would be 
reasonable for us to talk. The content of these norms differs across my friendships, and in each case, 
is designed to make sense for a particular friendship; this illustrates how those relationship-based 
norms that play the internal role allow members of a specific relationship to jointly choose among a 
variety of permissible ways to be with others. 
Relationship-based norms are to be contrasted with general norms, which are not created in 
the context of any particular relationship.51 General norms are further divisible into a number of 
                                                        
51 This language about the creation of norms is the primary way that I mean to distinguish general 
norms from relationship-based norms. I do not mean to suggest that general norms apply universally 
or that they do not implicate any relational considerations in terms of when they apply or are 
appropriately enforced. On my view, many of our special obligations are general norms, for though 
in one sense they depend on the relationship between obligor and obligee for their application, they 
are not created by those individuals. 
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categories, including moral norms, legal norms, and norms of etiquette. In the case of both morality 
and etiquette, there may well be relationship-based norms that have similar if not identical content 
with such general norms, but it seems to me less obvious that this is so in the legal case. Let us 
consider each in turn.  
There is, plausibly, a general moral norm whose content is “Be truthful to others.” But we 
must all be taught about this norm in childhood, and my suggestion is that relationship-based norms 
are used to facilitate that teaching. It might well be the case that there is a relationship-based version 
of that norm that is a part of many parent-child relationships. One might imagine a parent finding it 
inappropriate for a stranger to hold her young child responsible if the child is less than truthful. 
Again, what distinguishes the relationship-based norm from the general norm is that the former is 
created in that specific parent-child relationship and is enforceable only by the parties in that 
relationship (in this case, the parent).  
A parallel point can be made about norms of etiquette. To return to your friend who is 
extremely frank with others, there are likely general norms of etiquette that prohibit his level of 
frankness. Depending on the cause of his behavior, it may be more or less obvious whether these 
general norms apply to him. If he is incapable of adhering to such norms, or it is extremely difficult 
for him to do so, an appreciation of this might suggest that he ought to be exempted from blame in 
light of general norms of etiquette, but nonetheless he might still be appropriately subject to 
relationship-based norms with similar content. These relationship-based norms ideally take into 
account both the difficulty associated with being tactful for him, as well as the social importance of 
his doing so. In both this example and the prior one, which involve agents with some degree of 
impairment, there will likely also be a difference in the range of consequences that would count as 
appropriate enforcement of the relevant relationship-based norms. 
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Finally, in the case of legal norms, it seems less obvious to me how to understand a 
relationship-based version of them. Though there is considerable philosophical disagreement about 
the nature of law, let us assume with H.L.A. Hart and Jean Hampton that, “…there are (at least) two 
kinds of law, those which are power-conferring rules, for example, rules which specify how to make 
a contract or a will, and those which are ‘rules of obligation’…Philosophers and legal theorists have 
generally analyzed the structure of…[rules of obligation]…as ‘orders backed by threats’ made by the 
state” (Hampton 210). It is perhaps easier to make sense of a relationship-based analogue of power-
conferring rules, as one can certainly confer powers onto others in relationships (e.g., by making 
promises to them). Still, one might think this has a substantially different character than the rules 
which specify how to construct a legally binding contract, and therefore that there is unlikely to be 
similar content in the two kinds of norms. In the case of rules of obligation, it is still more 
challenging to see how they could have relationship-based analogues. Hampton characterizes such 
rules as, 
“…[ideally] drawn either from ethical imperatives, of the form ‘don't steal,’ or ‘don't 
murder,’ or else from imperatives made necessary for moral reasons, for example, ‘drive on 
the right’ so that the safety of others on the road is insured…The state makes these two 
kinds of commands not only to define a minimal set of duties which a human being in that 
community must follow in his or her dealings with others, but also to designate actions 
which, when followed by all members of the society, will solve various problems of conflict 
and coordination” (Hampton 210). 
 
In either case, Hampton suggests, the law is meant to represent a requirement on all members of 
society, which either directly reflects an ethical imperative or does so derivatively (e.g., one must 
drive on the right side of the road for the safety of others). It is unclear, then, that we should 
understand relationship-based norms with similar content to rules of obligation as corresponding to 
legal norms, rather than moral norms, especially since they would be enforced interpersonally rather 
than by the state. I do not mean to rule out the possibility that perhaps there could be relationship-
based norms with similar content to legal norms, but only to show that it is difficult to understand 
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what precisely that would mean. One thing that this discussion of legal norms does show, however, 
is that norms are routinely individuated by something other than their content; many legal norms 
share their content with moral norms but are understood as distinct norms partly in virtue of being 
enforced by the state, rather than interpersonally. 
4. What Relationships Have Been Thought to Provide 
 Now that I have compared and contrasted relationship-based norms and general norms in 
some respects, I would like to do the same with respect to other relational considerations having to 
do with responsibility from elsewhere in the philosophical literature. 
4a. Special Obligations 
One way that philosophers have already recognized that relationships matter to 
responsibility is via the notion of special obligations. Special obligations are, roughly speaking, things 
that we owe to some persons that we do not owe to everyone. These obligations paradigmatically 
arise in intimate relationships, including parent-child relationships, friendships, and romantic 
relationships. How special obligations relate to morality, and how they acquire their normative force, 
is a subject of some controversy. But if one starts one’s theorizing by reflecting on ordinary practice, 
the existence of these obligations seems substantially less controversial. Moreover, from this 
perspective, many special obligations seem moral in nature; when we consider why a parent owes it 
to her child to provide for her basic needs, for example, this seems to be a moral matter. 
Though all relationship-based norms give rise to special obligations (in the sense that we 
owe it to some people but not to others to uphold the relevant norms), special obligations are also 
connected to norms that are not relationship-based. Some special obligations are moral and hold 
because the parties in question have a relationship that is of a certain type, while relationship-based 
norms arise from and are enforceable only in the context of a particular token relationship. For 
example, all adult children may have a special obligation to ensure their aging parents are well-cared 
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for, perhaps barring certain exceptions.52 But relationship-based norms do not have such a general 
application. The norm between the parent and the child that he ought not scream in a public space 
unless he is hurt or in danger arises and is enforceable only in that specific relationship. While other 
parents and children may very well have a similar norm that holds between them given the social 
significance of that relationship type, the mere fact that a relationship is a parent-child relationship 
does not entail that the parties in question have that particular relationship-based norm. 
One might be skeptical of this claim that each parent-child relationship has its own set of 
relationship-based norms. After all, children generally have to complete the same sort of 
developmental tasks and have to learn what will be expected of them when they become mature 
members of the moral community. Therefore, one might assume that the majority of norms that 
hold between parents and their children are not created in the context of that token relationship, 
which is a necessary condition of such norms being relationship-based.  
I agree that parents are largely responsible for aiding their children’s development and moral 
education. As such, there may be a lot of similarity between norms that arise in all parent-child 
relationships. Nonetheless, there is also a lot of difference. In one family, the children might be 
expected to volunteer in their community, in another they might be expected to wash the dishes, in 
still another they might be expected to cook dinner for their younger siblings on the nights their 
parents have to work late. These are all examples of relationship-based norms that do not arise in 
every parent-child relationship. Even with respect to norms that we might expect there to be a 
version of in every parent-child relationship, there may be variations in the consequences that serve 
as responses to upholding or violating those norms. Suppose two parent-child relationships have a 
                                                        
52 Say, if one had been abandoned by one’s parents as a child, or if one is otherwise estranged from 
them. If one admits these exceptions, one might say that as long as there is still a parent-child 
relationship between these two individuals, then the relevant special obligations still apply. 
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norm with the content that the child must abstain from screaming when he is in public places unless 
he is hurt or in danger. One parent might respond to her child’s screaming by giving him a “time 
out,” whereas another parent might dislike the use of “time outs” in this sort of situation and instead 
respond by removing the child from the restaurant and discussing with him why his behavior was 
unacceptable. Though these norms have the same content, they are nonetheless two separate 
relationship-based norms as I understand them. Moreover, this same general structure for 
relationship-based norms is not unique to parent-child relationships, and applies equally to 
friendships, romantic relationships, and so on. 
One may therefore understand the relationship between special obligations and relationship-
based norms as follows: The category of special obligations includes relationship-based norms, but 
also norms that are not relationship-based as well. Importantly, it includes moral norms that hold 
between individuals in virtue of their having a relationship of a certain type. The source of those 
norms is not, however, any token relationship, but whatever the source is of moral norms more 
generally.53 Relationship-based norms are, to some degree, likewise constrained by the relationship 
type because different types of relationships play different social roles. Nonetheless, there is still 
considerable variation in how exactly particular relationships enact those roles, and how the parties 
in those relationships choose to be with each other.  
4b. Proleptic Blame (and Beyond) 
Bernard Williams theorized about another sort of relational consideration in our practices of 
holding others responsible when he developed the notion of “proleptic blame” in “Internal Reasons 
and the Obscurity of Blame.” Williams famously endorsed internalism about reasons, according to 
                                                        
53 For any special obligations that are not moral (that are perhaps legal, or etiquette-based), they 
likewise have their source in whatever the source is of legal or etiquette-based norms, which is 
similarly not a token relationship. 
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which one has to be capable of being motivated to perform an action via a sound deliberative route 
from one’s existing motivational set in order to have a reason to perform that action. He also 
recognized, however, that sometimes we blame people for their failure to perform actions that we 
think they ought to have performed even when we don’t think they had decisive reason to do so in 
the internalist sense. We do so because we think,  
“…they may have a motivation to avoid the disapproval of other people…[This] can be the 
ethically important disposition that consists in a desire to be respected by people whom, in 
turn, one respects…In these circumstances, blame consists of…a proleptic invocation of a 
reason to do or not do a certain thing, which applies in virtue of a disposition to have the 
respect of other people. To blame someone in this way is, roughly, to tell him he had a 
reason to act otherwise, and in a direct sense this may not have been true. Yet in a way it has 
now become true, in virtue of his having a disposition to do things that people he respects 
expect of him, and in virtue of the recognition, which it is hoped that the blame will bring to 
him, of what those people expect” (Williams 41-2). 
 
By discussing the possibility of blame as “a proleptic invocation of a reason to do or not do a certain 
thing,” Williams suggests that though blame standardly involves an acknowledgement that a person 
already had a reason that they should have acted on, it can also be a way of leveraging someone’s 
desire to be respected by those whom they respect into new motivations that the blamer thinks that 
the target of blame should have had all along (Williams 41). 
Williams’ description of proleptic blame strikes me as a familiar part of our social practices 
of holding responsible. Indeed, while Williams’ use of ‘prolepsis’ refers specifically to blame (in 
particular the kind of blame that can still be appropriate even if it is unlikely that the target of blame 
had an internalist reason to do otherwise), it seems to me that we have a wider variety of proleptic 
responsibility responses in ordinary life aside from blame. At least, there are other ways that we 
leverage our relationships with others to shape their motivations by holding them responsible that 
do not involve resentment, anger, or other emotions thought to be typical of expressions of blame. 
Imagine, for example, that you are a parent of a teenager who recently got into a car accident and is 
now terrified to get back on the road. As his parent, you appreciate his anxiety but recognize that he 
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is a relatively safe driver, and in any case that he will only improve if he practices. Your relationship 
with your son, in addition to your knowledge of these considerations, plays an important role in its 
being appropriate for you to hold him responsible for getting back on the horse, so to speak. But 
presumably that holding responsible should not take the form of blame understood in terms of the 
negative reactive attitudes. 
Proleptic responsibility responses, like special obligations, represent how the relationship 
between two parties can affect whether it is appropriate for one to hold the other responsible. But 
proleptic responsibility responses have a more direct connection to my view of being responsible as 
being subject to norms because these responses are one method by which the parties in relationships 
create norms for each other. Williams shows in his discussion of proleptic blame that we can 
sometimes be motivated to attend to considerations that we would not have recognized but for the 
exhortations of those we respect. One way this might happen is by making us feel accountable to the 
other person to behave as they wish we would. For example, suppose your father is a smoker and 
though his health is starting to suffer because of it, he is not at all moved to quit. You might 
proleptically hold him responsible for quitting – that is, you might leverage your relationship with 
him and his desire to have your respect in order to motivate him to give up smoking. It is possible 
that as a result of that holding responsible, your father might regard quitting as something that he 
owes to you, and your relationship is an essential part of his being accountable for quitting. In such a 
case, you have created a relationship-based norm between you and your father regarding his 
smoking. 
But not all instances of proleptic responsibility responses aim at creating relationship-based 
norms. In some cases, we may proleptically hold someone responsible where our aim is not to create 
a new norm with that person, but to call their attention to general norms to which they are properly 
subject as a member of the wider community. For example, imagine you have a friend who believes 
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that homeless people are simply lazy and therefore to blame for their own circumstances. You might 
proleptically blame him for this, meaning that you’re unsure that your friend is capable of 
recognizing why his views are problematic without the influence of your blame and his desire to 
have your respect. Your hope in this case is presumably not that he will regard himself as 
accountable to you for correcting his views about homeless people, but rather that your blame is 
instrumental in getting him to attend to the moral considerations in favor of revising his views. 
Perhaps in some cases where we proleptically hold someone responsible, we “settle” for a 
relationship-based norm when we would prefer to draw the person’s attention to a general norm to 
which they are properly subject. Suppose, for example, your husband has a habit of calling women 
“honey,” which seems sexist to you. You’re unsure about his ability to see his behavior as sexist, 
since he has said in his defense that he doesn’t intend anything malicious by it. While you agree that 
there are no malicious intentions on his part, you don’t think this suffices to show that his behavior 
isn’t sexist. In proleptically holding him responsible to stop calling all women ‘honey,’ your hope is 
that he will come to appreciate why that’s something he owes to the wider community, and not just 
to you. But while he may fail to internalize that norm as a general norm, he may nonetheless regard 
himself as accountable to you to stop addressing women in this way, where your holding him 
responsible was essential to the creation of this relationship-based norm. 
In general, proleptically holding someone responsible strikes me as a hopeful gesture that 
has a natural home in interpersonal relationships. In some cases, the hope is that the person will 
regard themselves as subject to a general norm, while in others, the creation of a relationship-based 
norm might be your aim. Regardless, this notion of prolepsis is important to understanding how we 
become subject to norms. 
 
 




Throughout this chapter, I have given a wide variety of examples in which relationships 
serve as sources of norms. In doing so, I hope to have motivated the thought that relationship-based 
norms play an integral role in determining what it means to be responsible and be appropriately held 
responsible. I have also argued that this way of understanding responsibility suggests a continuity 
between marginal and non-marginal agents, for both are responsible in virtue of being subject to 
norms. In what remains, I would like to consider some further implications of this.  
In the previous chapter, I presented this view as a rival to the degrees of responsibility view, 
according to which there are degrees of responsibility, and marginal agents are responsible but to a 
lesser degree than paradigm responsible agents. I argued against the degrees of responsibility view 
on the grounds that it still mistakenly locates responsibility solely in the capacities of individual 
agents, while responsibility properly understood is fundamentally relational. In doing so, I did not 
mean to suggest that the capacities of individual agents are wholly irrelevant to responsibility, 
however. Agents must have certain capacities in order to be able to enter into relationships with 
other persons, regard them as sources of norms, and to do what some of these norms would require 
of them in order to be responsible on my view. Part of what I have tried to demonstrate here is that 
these capacities are more minimal, and are typically present far earlier in our lives, than full-blown 
normative and agential competence as those notions are typically understood.  
But another aspect of my view is that many agents have deficits in the cognitive and 
volitional capacities philosophers associate with responsible agency, some of whom are standardly 
considered marginal agents and some of whom are considered instead grieving, or impulsive, or 
under great strain. Those who know about and appreciate those deficits might well excuse such 
agents from some of the general norms to which they ordinarily regard others in the community as 
subject. And those who are in relationships with these agents might construct less demanding 
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versions of those general norms, in the ways that I have touched on above. One might therefore 
insist that I am simply offering a variant of the degrees of responsibility view, dressed up in 
relational clothing, for it is at least partially the deficits of individual agents that make it the case that 
they would be responsible for less than agents ordinarily are.  
In response to this, I would like to suggest that it is not at all obvious that there is one 
standard set of general norms that apply to all agents except those with deficits. What we are 
responsible for is essentially a social matter on my view, and it is no objection to this view that our 
responsibilities are partially a function of who we are and how we are doing; we are a part of our 
own social world, and an indispensable one at that. I likewise have no problem with the view that 
there are degrees of responsibility, but I still don’t think either that this suffices to understand how 
marginal agents participate in our responsibility practices, or to show that marginal agents are 
uniformly responsible to a lesser degree than paradigm responsible agents. My suggestion is rather 
that what we are responsible for is a flexible matter, sensitive to both what we are capable of and 
how others see us, among other considerations. Though it matters what tools we are equipped with 
psychologically, responsibility is still always something we possess partly in virtue of others, from 
childhood to the end of our lives. 
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The Bounds of Responsible Agency 
 
“Do I care about other people? That’s a tough one. But, yeah, I guess I really do...but I don’t let my 
feelings get in the way...You’ve got to look out for yourself, park your feelings...Do I feel bad if I 
have to hurt someone? Yeah, sometimes. But mostly it’s like...uh...[laughs]...how did you feel the last 
time you squashed a bug?”54  
 
“A refusal to give commands or to notice that commands are being given is often a refusal to 
acknowledge a relationship, just as is a refusal to obey.” – Vicki Hearne, Adam’s Task 55  
 
“The willingness to take a chance on some form of reciprocity is the essence of holding someone 




In this chapter, I want to explore the consequences that my view of responsibility has for 
determining the boundaries of the responsibility community - that is, who is responsible and is 
appropriately held responsible and who is not. Let us therefore revisit the central aspects of this 
view: First, I have argued that to be responsible in some domain is to be subject to norms in that 
domain.57 For example, to be morally responsible is to be subject to moral norms. We are also 
subject to relationship-based norms; these norms are created in our interpersonal relationships, and 
the other parties in those relationships have a special authority to hold us responsible for upholding 
                                                        
54 A psychopath serving time for kidnapping, rape, and extortion, said this during an interview 
conducted by Robert Hare. Hare is a clinical psychologist who works with criminal populations, and 
who created the primary instrument used to diagnose psychopathy. See Hare (1999), pg. 33. 
 
55 Hearne (1986), pg. 49 
 
56 Korsgaard (1996), pg. 196. 
 
57 Whether a person is subject to a norm is partly a function of her capacities to understand and be 
sensitive to the relevant expectations. In the case of relationship-based norms, it is also partly a 




the relevant expectations.58 Second, what makes a response to another agent an instance of holding 
her responsible is that it constitutes holding a member of the interpersonal community to a norm.59 
Holding responsible in this sense can take a variety of forms, including not only blaming or 
punishing agents for norm violations, but also crediting them for doing what was expected of them, 
or reminding them of the existence of these norms in a forward-looking way. Third, this 
understanding of responsibility is relational, meaning that responsibility is always responsibility to 
someone for something.60  
Conceptualizing responsibility as fundamentally relational is one place where I depart 
significantly from standard accounts of responsibility, which characterize responsibility as a property 
that individual agents bear solely in virtue of possessing the capacities required for normative and 
agential competence. Therefore, I have tried to motivate the need for this departure at length. Part 
of what I aim to clarify in this chapter, however, is that I do not mean to suggest that the properties 
of individual agents are wholly irrelevant to responsibility, but rather that their importance is always 
mediated by social considerations. Though I have argued that there is no categorical difference 
between marginal and non-marginal agents with respect to responsibility, it is a consequence of my 
                                                        
58 I am therefore offering a view about responsibility as (deep) accountability. Shallow accountability, 
which I discuss further below, is exclusive of responsibility. I am, for purposes of this project, 
neutral on the question of whether there are other forms of responsibility such as attributability or 
answerability.  
 
59 I will say more about the connection between responsibility and membership in the interpersonal 
community in section 2b. 
 
60 When I refer to the question of whether psychopaths and non-human animals are responsible, this 
should be interpreted as shorthand for the question of whether these individuals are capable of 
being responsible to anyone for anything. This shorthand is not ideal for my purposes given that I 
regard responsibility as fundamentally relational, but I make use of it for ease of exposition. 
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view that in order to be responsible, one must be able to enter into relationships with others and 
regard them as sources of norms. This means in turn that one must possess certain psychological 
capacities, though possession of those capacities alone is not sufficient for responsibility. I will be 
discussing what this means with respect to the potential responsibility of psychopaths and non-
human animals.61  
These cases seem markedly different with respect to responsibility than other cases involving 
so-called marginal agents. It seems substantially less clear whether anyone is entitled to hold these 
agents responsible than it does in the case of children, addicts, people with cognitive disabilities, and 
so on. This uncertainty, I want to suggest, originates with difficulties in knowing whether either 
psychopaths or non-human animals are capable of entering into relationships with others such that 
they can regard them as sources of norms. In the case of non-human animals, this difficulty is 
related to difficulties in knowing what their internal lives are like, including how closely they 
resemble our own, because we are unable to engage in linguistic communication with them. In the 
case of psychopaths, this problem takes on a different form. We can converse with psychopaths and 
assess their behavior as fellow human beings, but we may nonetheless find their attitudes and 
behavior disturbing to the point of being unintelligible. In addition, it may be intuitive to some 
extent that psychopaths ought to be blamed or punished if they harm others, but much of the 
support for this intuition lies in wanting either to protect other members of the community, or to 
seek revenge for the wrongdoing in question.  
                                                        
61 I by no means wish to equate psychopaths and non-human animals or to suggest that the 
impairments of psychopaths make them “beast-like.” I consider both categories of agent here 
because it is unobvious whether they count as responsible on my view, albeit for different reasons. 
Considering these reasons in more detail will shed light on what I regard the boundaries of the 
responsibility community to be. 
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Moreover, there also seems to me to be a “shallow” form of accountability, as I discussed 
briefly in Chapter 1. An individual is or can be shallowly accountable when they are able to 
appreciate that there are norms that apply in a context they are in and they are capable of upholding 
them, even when they are not capable of appreciating why those norms exist or being motivated to 
uphold them for non-self-interested reasons.62 If a psychopath is not capable of being motivated by 
moral considerations, but he recognizes what is widely considered morally wrong and is able to 
avoid such behavior, he would be shallowly accountable for doing so. Shallow accountability does 
not depend on membership in the interpersonal community or the ability to regard your 
relationships with others as sources of norms. Therefore, it is distinct from responsibility as (deep) 
accountability. Holding someone shallowly accountable, like holding them responsible, may involve 
the enforcement of a norm, but the aim of this practice is simply to incentivize good behavior. 
Wanting to protect the interests of others in the interpersonal community, or to hold psychopaths 
shallowly accountable are both separable from judgments about the responsibility of psychopaths in 
the sense under discussion. As a result, our assessment of whether psychopaths are responsible is 
often clouded by considerations that are irrelevant once properly understood. I will begin by 
reflecting on what I believe would need to be shown in order to demonstrate whether, and to what 




                                                        
62 Psychopaths also characteristically have problems with impulse control, which would make it 
more difficult for them to conform their behavior to norms, even when they recognize that others 
will expect this of them. I discuss the significance of this further in Section 2.  
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2. Responsibility Without Conscience?  
Much of the philosophical literature about marginal agency concerns psychopaths, which is 
striking given that psychopathy has a much lower incidence in the population than many other 
conditions that give rise to deficits in the cognitive and volitional capacities typically associated with 
responsible agency (compare addiction, or being a child for that matter). Psychopaths have likely 
attracted significant philosophical interest because the very deficits that make them prone to 
behavior that seems prima facie blameworthy raise questions about their eligibility for blame or other 
responsibility responses. Psychopaths are not only impaired, but impaired in puzzling ways that 
some have hoped will shed light on the nature of responsibility more generally. As Jeanette Kennett 
writes, “Psychopaths have long been of interest to moral philosophers, since a careful examination 
of their peculiar deficiencies may reveal what features are normally critical to the development of 
moral agency” (Kennett 340). In order to understand what philosophers have hoped to learn from 
the existence of psychopaths, one must first understand how philosophers and psychologists have 
characterized what it means to be a psychopath. I will therefore begin by giving an overview of the 
literature on this topic. 
 a. The Nature of Psychopathy 
Psychopathy has never been a diagnostic category in the DSM, though psychopaths are 
understood as a subset of those with antisocial personality disorder, which is a DSM diagnosis. 
Antisocial personality disorder can only be diagnosed in adults, but there is a corresponding 
diagnosis for children, known as conduct disorder. This diagnosis may or may not include the 
specification that the child in question displays callous and unemotional traits.63 The empirical 
                                                        
63 In DSM-V, this specification is also referred to as the child’s “lack of pro-social emotions.” To be 
diagnosed with conduct disorder with callous and unemotional traits, a child must consistently 
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literature indicates that, “Psychopathy is a developmental disorder, usually appearing in early 
childhood (certainly by eight years of age) and continuing throughout the lifespan…” (Blair 707). 
Children with conduct disorder with callous and unemotional traits are also known as children with 
psychopathic tendencies. 
Linguistic considerations aside, there is substantial disagreement about how to understand 
the core features of psychopathy, which seems to involve a number of interrelated cognitive, 
affective, and volitional deficits. In particular, psychopaths have been characterized as having poor 
impulse control, shallow affect, problems with anxiety and fear processing, difficulty distinguishing 
moral and conventional rules, and an impaired ability to be sensitive to and moved by the suffering 
of others.64 Psychopathy is primarily diagnosed using Robert Hare’s Revised Psychopathy Checklist 
(PCL-R), which is administered as a semi-structured clinical interview, typically in an institutional 
setting. The checklist includes 20 items, as follows: 
“1. Glibness/superficial charm 
2. Grandiose sense of self-worth 
                                                        
display two of the following over a period of at least a year: lack of remorse or guilt, callousness or 
lack of empathy, being unconcerned about one’s performance (e.g., in school or work), and shallow 
or deficient affect. 
 
64 A naïve way of understanding the nature of psychopathy is that it involves a total lack of empathy, 
such that psychopaths can harm others guilt-free. This is not quite true, or at least it requires further 
clarification. Psychopaths do not have clinically significant difficulties with cognitive empathy, or 
taking up another person’s perspective in the sense of knowing what they are thinking. But they do 
have marked impairments with respect to emotional empathy – that is, in correctly identifying and 
being motivated by other people’s emotions. As Blair writes, “Individuals with psychopathy do show 
a selective emotional empathy dysfunction; they are impaired in the processing of fearful, sad, and 
possibly disgusted expressions. Indeed, this impairment is likely to be at the heart of the disorder” 
(Blair 710). Psychopaths are often contrasted in the empirical literature with people with autism 
spectrum disorders (ASD), who show deficits in cognitive empathy but not emotional empathy. See, 
for example, Jones, et al., who write, “Psychopathic tendencies are associated with difficulties in 
resonating with other people’s distress, whereas ASD is characterized by difficulties in knowing what 
other people think” (Jones, et al. 1188). 
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3. Need for stimulation 
4. Pathological lying 
5. Conning/manipulative 
6. Lack of remorse or guilt 
7. Shallow affect 
8. Callous/lack of empathy 
9. Parasitic lifestyle  
10. Poor behavioral controls 
11. Promiscuous sexual behavior 
12. Early behavior problems 
13. Lack of realistic goals 
14. Impulsivity 
15. Irresponsibility 
16. Failure to accept responsibility  
17. Many short-term relationships  
18. Juvenile delinquency 
19. Revocation of conditional release  
20. Criminal versatility” (Hare, et al. (1990) 339, emphasis mine) 
 
One can receive a score of up to two points for each item. To meet criteria for psychopathy, one 
must receive a score of 30 or greater. Because of the structure of the PCL-R, people with a variety of 
clinical presentations could theoretically be diagnosed as psychopaths.  
Statistical analysis of the data derived from administering the PCL-R suggests that 
psychopaths’ symptoms tend to cluster into two groups or factors, which I will call the 
interpersonal/affective and executive functioning-related factors respectively.65 These factors are 
strongly correlated with each other, but they can also come apart. The bolded items in the list above 
are the interpersonal/affective items, which will be the ones of primary concern in my discussion of 
psychopaths. The reason for this emphasis is that these items are most directly relevant to the social 
functioning of psychopaths. The executive functioning-related items play an important, albeit 
                                                        
65 For more on this, see Harpur, et al. (1989). I am stipulating these descriptors for Hare’s Factor 1 
and Factor 2. There are variety of other descriptors in the literature, and my hope is that the ones I 
have chosen represent a compromise among them. Also, Items 11 and 20 (promiscuous sexual 
behavior and criminal versatility) on Hare’s Checklist are not strongly correlated with either factor, 
but they remain part of the instrument. 
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secondary, role because they suggest that psychopaths have difficulties with impulse control. This 
impulsivity, in concert with deficits in emotional empathy, might make it especially difficult for 
psychopaths to regard themselves as subject to norms, much less to actually uphold such norms.
 There is considerable evidence that psychopaths are markedly impaired in their social 
functioning. Though such individuals are capable of having relationships, these relationships are 
characteristically superficial and short-lived. There are likely a number of considerations that 
contribute to this. I will consider some that are present in children with psychopathic tendencies as 
well as adult psychopaths below. The authors of a study comparing the social functioning of 
children with conduct disorder to those with autism spectrum disorders write, “Parents of young 
people in both groups report high levels of many interpersonal difficulties, particularly severe anger-
related behavior in the [conduct disorder] (CD) group” (Green et al. 291). Another study, which was 
designed to measure “how much boys with psychopathic tendencies care about the consequences of 
aggressive actions on a victim…” said, “…they reported caring less than comparison boys and boys 
with ASD [autism spectrum disorders] about their own feelings, as well as the feelings of the 
scenario victims. We also showed that boys with psychopathic tendencies attributed significantly less 
fear to themselves than comparison boys” (Jones et al. 1194). One can easily imagine how being 
prone to anger-related behavior, and to being less concerned than the average person about how 
that behavior harms others, would impede the development of close interpersonal relationships.  
In addition, the empathic deficits in children with psychopathic tendencies make some of the 
strategies that parents use to bring children up in the moral community ineffective. As Blair writes, 
“Individuals who are indifferent to the fear and sadness of others are individuals who are 
difficult to socialize through effective socialization practices [such] as empathy induction. 
Empathy induction involves the socializer focusing the attention of the transgressor on the 
distress of the victim (and presumably heightens the salience of the aversive stimulus of the 
victim’s distress). While the greater use of empathy induction and other positive forms of 
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parenting reduce the probability of antisocial behavior in healthy children, they have no 
significant effect on the probability of antisocial behavior in children with psychopathic 
tendencies…” (Blair 710-11). 
 
Blair also suggests that, “…if we could find means to increase the empathic reaction of children with 
psychopathic tendencies, we might be able to considerably improve the prognosis of this disorder” 
(Blair 711). This picture of children with psychopathic tendencies suggests a number of obstacles 
not only to their moral and agential development as individuals, but to their ability to form and be 
motivated by interpersonal relationships in ways that others typically are. On my view, these 
obstacles are essentially related.  
Though psychologists are currently investigating whether there are means to ameliorate the 
empathic deficits of children with psychopathic tendencies, in a typical case, these deficits persist 
into adulthood. They likewise impair adult psychopaths’ ability to have close relationships. In 
addressing the question of whether psychopaths characteristically treat family members differently 
from strangers, Robert Hare writes, “Psychopaths…display a general lack of empathy. They are 
indifferent to the rights and suffering of family members and strangers alike. If they do maintain ties 
with their spouses or children it is only because they see their family members as possessions, much 
like their stereos or automobiles” (Hare (1999) 45). 
 It is worth mentioning that many of the studies done about psychopathy have unusually 
small sample sizes, and they are often conducted in prisons or other institutional settings.66 As a 
consequence of this, the results may also be influenced by other psychosocial facts about the agents 
                                                        
66 Some of this has to do with the low incidence of psychopathy, which is estimated at around 1% of 
the general population (Hare and Neumann 795). In addition, presumably many psychopaths in 
community populations don’t openly self-identify as psychopaths and would not volunteer to 
participate in psychological research about psychopathy. 
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in question (e.g., low IQs, histories of abuse, and their current isolation). There has been some, 
albeit considerably less, study of “successful psychopaths” (i.e., those with high social status or 
without criminal convictions) in community populations, but “[b]ecause definitions of successful 
psychopaths can vary widely, it is difficult to draw conclusions about this research as a whole. Some 
samples of successful psychopaths include individuals who have previously been convicted of crimes 
and/or individuals who would not be considered successful in terms of acquiring resources or social 
status in society” (Glenn and Raine 158).67  
Despite the limitations of current research, psychopathy seems to be a genuinely identifiable 
and puzzling condition, one that puts pressure on a variety of theoretical views about the nature of 
responsible agency. As Levy writes, psychopaths “…seem to be in control of their actions, to do just 
what they want to do because they want to do it, and, therefore, to be responsible for their actions. 
They seem, in many ways, to be sane and rational. Yet in other respects they seem quite irrational; so 
much so that the term moral insanity has sometimes been applied to them…This strange 
phenomenon, the sane madman, seems to defy our attempts at understanding” (Levy 129). Now 
that I have surveyed some of the empirical discussion about the nature of psychopathy, I will turn 
more explicitly to the question of how to understand whether, and to what extent, psychopaths 
might be responsible. 
 
 
                                                        
67 Glenn and Raine suggest that in addition to using self-report measures to identify psychopaths in 
community samples, “[f]ocusing on perpetrators of white-collar crime may also be one way to 
recruit samples of psychopathic individuals with high social status who have successfully escaped 
detection for much of their lives” (Glenn and Raine 159). 
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 b. Psychopathy and Responsibility 
The puzzlement about psychopaths expressed in the philosophical literature is often about 
whether psychopaths could be morally responsible (and in particular, blameworthy) for their 
behavior given that they are not capable of being motivated by empathic concern in the way that 
people ordinarily are. This question is often framed in two ways: First, are psychopaths capable of 
having sufficient moral understanding to be appropriately subject to blame, assuming they are able 
to know what other people regard as moral transgressions and are at least minimally instrumentally 
rational?68 Second, if blame is a form of communication aimed at morally addressing a wrongdoer, 
and psychopaths are not capable of understanding this form of address, how could blaming them be 
justified? I will discuss both of these approaches in turn, though I will ultimately claim that the 
second is a more helpful way of thinking about the potential responsibility of psychopaths. Finally, I 
will discuss the relationship between the claim that psychopaths are responsible and judgments that 
they are deserving of blame or punishment. 
 
                                                        
68 One way that philosophers tend to oversimplify their characterizations of psychopathy is by 
suggesting that while psychopaths have no real problems with instrumental rationality, they lack 
empathy or moral sense. But some of the diagnostic criteria for psychopathy clear refer to problems 
with executive functioning (e.g., impulsivity, poor behavioral controls) and consequently with 
instrumental rationality as well. Psychopaths seem to exhibit these deficits to varying degrees. Glenn 
and Raine hypothesize that “successful psychopaths” (i.e., those with high social status or without 
criminal convictions) are more instrumentally rational than their lower-functioning counterparts. 
“For unsuccessful psychopaths, the combination of deficits in both emotional and cognitive abilities 
may result in antisocial individuals who have difficulty regulating their behavior, and who are less 
sensitive to environmental cues predicting danger and capture. Because of poor behavior controls, 
we hypothesize that they would be more prone to physical violence…Successful psychopaths may 
similarly engage in antisocial behavior because of a lack of empathy and emotional responding. 
However, we expect this behavior to be more planned and regulated. Intact or superior cognitive 
functioning may mean that successful psychopaths can con and manipulate others, and plan their 
crimes to better escape detection” (Glenn and Raine 158).  
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i. Moral Understanding 
As Levy writes, “Most attempts at assessing psychopaths’ moral responsibility have focused 
on the kind of moral knowledge…[they are]…capable of possessing” (Levy 130). In large part, this 
emphasis in this literature has come from the fact that psychopaths have been regarded as a kind of 
test case for motivational internalism, the metaethical view according to which moral beliefs are 
inherently motivating. According to some opponents of motivational internalism, psychopaths are in 
possession of moral beliefs but lack moral motivation; therefore, motivational internalism must be 
false.  
There are a number of problems, however, with viewing psychopaths as counterexamples to 
motivational internalism. First, the current empirical evidence about psychopathy is limited and 
should certainly be read as inconclusive about the relevant metaethical questions. For one thing, it is 
difficult to discern, experimentally or otherwise, whether psychopaths are in possession of the 
relevant moral beliefs.69 Indeed, internalists will insist that anyone lacking in moral motivation is not 
in possession of such beliefs. This is obviously question-begging, but as Levy notes, “…in this 
context it is possible to avoid begging the question only if we have an independent criterion for the 
attribution of moral beliefs. Lacking such a criterion, the debate is at an impasse” (Levy 131, 
emphasis in original). Even John Deigh, who is substantially more optimistic about the possibility 
that psychopathy could illuminate the nature of moral knowledge writes, “Psychopaths presumably, 
being minimally socialized, at least have knowledge of their community's conventional moral 
standards…To what extent psychopaths possess the more sophisticated knowledge that comes from 
                                                        
69 For more on this point, see Levy (2007) for discussion of a study done by Adina Roskies meant to 
assess the moral beliefs of patients with ventromedial cortex damage, who reportedly exhibit similar 
behavioral patterns to those of psychopaths. 
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understanding the reasons for the conventions and the ideals that give them meaning is, however, 
uncertain” (Deigh 748). In other words, it is not at all obvious that the most accurate way to 
describe how psychopaths are impaired is that they have moral beliefs but lack moral motivation.  
Setting aside questions about what psychopathy might have to teach us about moral 
understanding, however, one might independently think that moral understanding is necessary for 
being responsible, and therefore wonder whether psychopaths possess that understanding. Still, 
apart from the difficulties in coming up with satisfactory criteria for belief attribution that Levy 
notes, the impairments that psychopaths experience are not exclusively relevant to the moral 
domain. While psychopathy is often associated with impairments in the ability to discern moral from 
conventional rules, psychopaths’ empathic deficits are more global than this.70 If, as Blair writes, 
psychopaths “show a selective emotional empathy dysfunction; they are impaired in the processing 
of fearful, sad, and possibly disgusted expressions…” (Blair 710), then this would not only affect 
their sensitivity to moral considerations. It is likely to impair psychopaths’ social functioning broadly 
speaking, and to interfere with their sensitivity to conventional norms as well.71  
As someone who holds the view that moral understanding (or as he puts it, moral sense) is a 
necessary condition for responsible agency, Paul Russell makes a helpful distinction between two 
ways that one can be said to possess understanding of a particular norm. Russell claims while 
psychopaths are sometimes motivated to act in accordance with moral norms to avoid blame and 
                                                        
70 See also chapter 5 of Shoemaker (2015) for other worries about using the moral/conventional 
distinction to understand psychopathy, particularly pg. 147-166. 
 
71 It is curious that given psychopaths’ impairments in social functioning, they characteristically also 
display superficial charm. Perhaps because their emotional empathy dysfunction is selective, as Blair 
describes, they are better able to pick up on the behavior that others find pleasing than the behavior 
they find threatening, and therefore able to be charming in a limited sense.   
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punishment, that motivation is “…‘external’ to the moral considerations that ground those attitudes 
and practices” (Russell 298). Agents with moral sense, in contrast, are capable of recognizing the 
legitimacy and significance of the norms one might be blamed for violating, and therefore possess a 
great deal more than an intellectual understanding of the content of these norms and an appreciation 
that one is liable to be blamed for violating them. This description of psychopaths as inclined not to 
violate moral norms when they are likely to be caught depends to a certain extent on overlooking 
psychopaths’ tendencies toward grandiosity and difficulties with impulse control (which they seem 
to have to varying degrees). Nonetheless, it brings out a promising way of understanding the 
significance of psychopaths’ socialization with respect to whether they are responsible and can be 
appropriately held responsible for upholding moral norms. In addition, given psychopaths’ 
interpersonal difficulties beyond the moral realm, it seems plausible that this point could be 
generalized to conventional norms as well. Psychopaths’ “minimal socialization” gives them some 
appreciation of what norms people conventionally regard as binding, and what the likely 
consequences will be of their upholding or violating such norms. But it yields no “internal” or non-
self-interested reasons to obey those norms, or, at the very least, no such reasons that are 
motivationally salient to psychopaths.  
Despite finding Russell’s distinction helpful for understanding the significance of 
psychopaths’ socialization with respect to their sensitivity to norms, I nonetheless have some 
reservations about it. First, a substantial segment of the population of psychopaths has difficulties 
with executive functioning that make it unlikely that they are consistently acting in accordance even 
with their self-interested reasons. This diminishes the significance of the distinction between 
“internal” and “external” motivations for understanding to what extent psychopaths are sensitive to 
norms. Second, I have argued that responsibility is relational, and therefore the importance of 
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individuals’ psychological capacities to responsibility is always mediated by social considerations. It is 
important, therefore, to attend not only to psychopaths’ moral understanding (or lack thereof) as 
individuals, but to consider to what extent they are able to participate in the social practices 
connected to responsibility.  
ii. Address and Reciprocity 
Another way of understanding the question of whether psychopaths are responsible uses the 
language of moral address. The basic idea behind this approach is that holding someone responsible 
(particularly when this takes the form of blame or punishment), expresses a kind of moral demand 
that only makes sense against a backdrop where that demand is likely to be understood.72 Where an 
individual seems incapable of understanding the relevant demand, it is unclear how holding him 
responsible could be appropriate.73 As Gary Watson writes, “Does morally addressing another make 
sense unless we suppose that the other can see some reason to take us seriously, to acknowledge our 
claims? Can we be in a moral community with those who reject the basic terms of moral 
community?” (Watson (2004) 234). Watson isn’t speaking here specifically about psychopaths, but 
his remarks might easily be extended to them. Indeed, when Watson does consider psychopaths 
explicitly, what he says seems continuous with the worries about moral address he raised previously: 
“Those who (without psychosis or coercion) deliberately and callously harm, defraud, and 
manipulate others, as psychopaths frequently do, seem appropriately subject to blame and to 
applicable penal sanction. And yet psychopathy (as I read the evidence) precisely involves an 
incapacity to recognize the interests of others as making any valid claims on them. 
Consequently, they are disabled from standing in the reciprocal relations or (to use another 
                                                        
72 I take this point to be compatible with Russell’s characterization of psychopaths as lacking an 
“internal” appreciation of moral norms. There is a shift in emphasis, however, from the 
psychological deficits of psychopaths to the significance of those deficits in the social realm, as what 
explains why psychopaths are or are not responsible to others.  
 
73 This also explains what is so puzzling about blaming the dead, who can no longer be sensitive to 
our demands, moral or otherwise. 
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idiom) from engaging in the mutual recognition that lie at the core of moral life” (Watson 
(2011) 307). 
 
What Watson seems to be suggesting here is that one is not blameworthy simply in virtue of having 
intentionally performed a wrongful action; being blameworthy also requires a kind of moral 
accountability to others that psychopaths seem to lack.74  
Though I am broadly sympathetic to Watson’s outlook here, I am inclined to want to extend 
the notions of address and accountability beyond the moral to the social more generally.75 My reason 
for this is two-fold: First, in ordinary practice, moral accountability is sometimes indistinguishable 
from other forms of accountability. For example, it seems indeterminate whether being extremely 
frank with others without regard for their feelings is a violation of a moral norm or a more broadly 
social norm. And second, for the reasons I have explained above, I believe psychopaths’ empathic 
deficits affect not only their ability to be sensitive to moral considerations, but also to have close 
interpersonal relationships. Therefore, we should expect that they have difficulties fully appreciating 
                                                        
74 Watson goes on to suggest that while psychopaths are beyond the realm of moral accountability, it 
may be practically very difficult to distinguish psychopaths from serial wrongdoers who still fall 
within that realm. He writes, “Given the messiness of psychopathic agency, and our limited 
epistemic position, it is difficult in real life to be confident that we can avoid this mistake” (Watson 
(2011) 323). Watson argues that given this epistemic problem, and out of concern for justice, we 
should “attempt…to err in the right direction” by treating those agents who appear to be 
psychopaths as if they are still capable of redemption (Watson (2011) 323). Ultimately, “Holding one 
another morally accountable honors the value of mutual recognition and expresses a basic form of 
respect. The telos of this practice is the prospect of codeliberation and reconciliation. In the case of 
psychopathy, I have argued, this hope is forlorn. Psychopaths are, in this sense, irredeemably 
alien…[However, this] dramatic conclusion may warrant surprisingly little revision of our legal and 
social arrangements” (Watson (2011) 322). 
75 I’m somewhat doubtful that this reflects a great divide between my view and Watson’s, but this 
blurriness between moral and social norms, and the modes of address that are associated with them, 
seems important to note nevertheless. 
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not only moral address, but interpersonal address more generally. Likewise, given the difficulties that 
Blair notes in using “empathy induction and other positive forms of parenting” (Blair 710) to 
socialize children with psychopathic tendencies, it seems likely that such children will be 
considerably less able to regard others as sources of norms.  
 I have argued that being in relationship with others such that one regards them as sources of 
norms is bound up with being responsible and being appropriately held responsible. This 
characterization of what it is to be a member of the responsibility community provides a natural way 
of understanding the reciprocity that Watson and others point to as central to moral life. Part of 
what it is to enter into a close relationship with another person is to be vulnerable to each other’s 
influence, and to care what they expect of you.76 Moreover, such relationships play an essential role 
in socialization, including moral development. Though psychopaths can understand what others 
conventionally regard as moral norms, for example, and their liability to blame or punishment if they 
violate those norms, this is distinct from their being able to regard others as potential normative 
authorities about how they ought to act. If psychopaths genuinely lack this latter ability, this suggests 
that in an important sense, they are not full members of the interpersonal community and therefore 
                                                        
76 Interestingly, Patricia Greenspan (2016) discusses a real-life example of an individual who was 
diagnosed with psychopathic tendencies in his early teens, when he was more impulsive. Though he 
self-reports a lack of emotional empathy and does not recognize any non-self-interested reasons to 
conform to moral norms, he does not currently have the issues with impulsivity typically 
characteristic of psychopaths (i.e., he would have a low Factor-2 score on the PCL-R). Greenspan 
reports that, “on his account, the risk of having to deal with the consequences of others’ blame 
would be enough to deter him, but he informs…[her]…that otherwise he would have no qualms 
even about murder” (Greenspan 270). This is just one case, and an unusual one at that. Moreover, 
the individual in question is no longer diagnosed as a psychopath (perhaps because he became less 
impulsive as an adult). But it suggests that there would still be a point to engaging in blame-like 
behavior with someone who didn’t recognize the validity of the other person’s normative demands 
on them. Arguably, these responses would be connected to shallow accountability rather than 
responsibility. 
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not responsible. Of course, by saying this about psychopaths, I do not mean to suggest that it would 
be permissible to treat them however one pleases, but rather that the appropriate stance towards 
them is something like Strawson’s objective attitude. For Strawson, “To adopt the objective attitude 
to another human being is to see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in 
a wide range of senses, might be called treatment; as something certainly to be taken account, 
perhaps precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to 
be avoided…” (Strawson 9). Given the limitations of the current empirical literature on 
psychopathy, and the strength of these claims, it would be premature to rule on them now. Still, I 
take myself to have offered reasons to think that the question of whether psychopaths are capable of 
responsible agency should be settled by appeal to the notion of reciprocity as I have understood it 
here. 
iii. Blame and Punishment 
It is rare to find discussion of the responsibility of psychopaths that is not primarily 
concerned with whether psychopaths could be appropriate objects of blame and punishment for 
harmful or criminal behavior. Levy, for example, treats the responsibility of psychopaths as a 
practical problem, for psychopaths,  
“…are (causally) responsible for a disproportionately large percentage of crimes: more than 
fifty percent of violent crimes, and a very large percentage of petty thefts, frauds, and other 
relatively minor crimes…Most do not go on to become murderers, but some do, in spectacular 
fashion…Ought we to hold the psychopath morally responsible for these crimes? Or should 
we excuse them, as we (typically) excuse those suffering from psychoses and some impulse-
control disorders?” (Levy 129).  
 
Given psychopaths’ propensity towards criminal activity, it may seem intuitive that they are 
deserving of penal sanctions, and therefore criminally responsible. Indeed, “in most jurisdictions, 
psychopathy is considered to be an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor for criminal 
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responsibility” (Hare (1998) 205). Cordelia Fine and Jeannette Kennett push back against this way of 
thinking about psychopaths, however. They argue that the standards commonly used to assess 
criminal responsibility, including the American Law Institute Model Penal Code and M’Naghten 
Rules, stipulate that one is excused from such responsibility if one does not know that the action in 
question is morally wrong (Fine and Kennett 427). But part of what makes someone a psychopath, 
Fine and Kennett argue, is that one could not undergo the normal developmental process by which 
we acquire moral understanding. Without that understanding, they conclude that psychopaths are 
neither morally nor criminally responsible (Fine and Kennett 432-3). Moreover, if punishment is 
necessarily meant to express resentment or indignation towards an offender, or to otherwise be a 
form of moral address, they claim it would be inappropriate to punish psychopaths. They write, 
“Moral address is not only wasted on nonmoral beings. It is unjust. We pervert the distinctively 
moral purposes of punishment…and the moral authority of criminal law when we misapply 
punishment, using it instead to vent our fear or dislike of…[an]…offender” (Fine and Kennett 434).  
 Whether or not one accepts this characterization of the moral dimensions of punishment, 
Fine and Kennett’s paper is instructive with respect to how to understand the appropriateness of 
punishing psychopaths if psychopaths lack moral understanding and cannot be reached by attempts 
at moral address. Psychopaths, on their view, should be punished because (and only insofar as) 
doing so prevents future crime and protects the interests of others in the community. Though they 
characterize psychopaths as blameless offenders, this does not wholly undermine the justification for 
punishing them; as they write, “The deterrence and community protection functions of punishment 
gain their legitimacy, not from utilitarian considerations of welfare, but from the fundamental moral 
right of self-defense of one’s significant interests” (Fine and Kennett 437). Of course, it might also 
be natural for victims of crimes committed by psychopaths as well as others in the community to 
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feel that justice in the form of retributive punishment should also be served. Given the evidence that 
psychopaths may not be full members of the interpersonal community, there is reason to doubt 
whether these desires can be satisfied in a morally justifiable way, beyond other worries about 
retributivism. Regardless, punishing psychopaths might still be justified for the sake of self-defense.77  
 Should we accept Fine and Kennett’s view that psychopaths are blameless offenders? On my 
view, blaming is an instance of a wide range of responses that count as holding someone 
responsible, where holding responsible consists in the enforcement of a norm in the interpersonal 
community. Though I have noted previously that blame is not the only fitting response to norm 
violations, it is certainly one among many. Whether psychopaths can be appropriately blamed in this 
sense, therefore, will likewise depend on whether, and to what extent, they are responsible.  
In the previous chapter, I also discussed proleptic blame, whereby the blamer attempts to 
leverage her relationship with the target of blame in order to change the latter’s deliberative 
landscape; this is one way that relationship-based norms can be created. Proleptic blame, however, 
relies on the target of blame’s being concerned with what others think of him. In characterizing 
proleptic blame, Williams writes, “In these circumstances, blame consists of…a proleptic invocation 
of a reason to do or not do a certain thing, which applies in virtue of a disposition to have the 
respect of other people” (Williams 41). Miranda Fricker characterizes the functions of blame, 
proleptic and otherwise, when she writes, “It is a communicative act that reprimands with feeling, in 
the hope of bringing the wrongdoer to better understand and perhaps correct her behaviour…What 
                                                        
77 If one wants to reserve the term “punishment” for certain types of treatment of responsible 
wrongdoers, then whether psychopaths are deserving of punishment will by definition depend on 
the extent to which they are responsible. I am using “punishment” in a broader way, to refer to a 
range of negative consequences for harmful conduct carried out interpersonally or by the state that 
one is either responsible or shallowly accountable for avoiding. 
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I am doing when I blame you…is either reminding you of a reason whose force you already 
recognized but failed to be appropriately swayed by; or alternatively (the proleptic possibility), in the 
event that you did not recognize the reason, I nonetheless treat you as if you did, where the negative 
attitude I therein direct at you may bring you to recognize the reason in some measure” (Fricker 
174-6). Neither of those possibilities seem obviously to obtain for psychopaths who act wrongly, 
given that their failures to obey moral norms aren’t attributable simply to poor deliberation, and 
psychopaths are unlikely to be moved to acknowledge their wrongdoing in order to have the respect 
of others. 
Nonetheless, psychopaths’ minimal socialization is sufficient for them to be shallowly 
accountable. After all, they know what others expect of them, even if they can’t fully appreciate the 
grounds for those expectations. Moreover, they are not totally incapable of conforming their 
conduct to those expectations, though this would be more difficult for those with poor impulse 
control. Thus, they may deserve a shallow analogue of blame or punishment, a sort of “faux-blame” 
whose aim is simply to deter the psychopath from engaging in harmful or criminal behavior in the 
future. Faux-blame may resemble blame from the outside in many ways, but the forms that it ought 
to take should be dictated by what most effectively promotes those aims, constrained by justice and 
decency. In other words, we should not subject psychopaths to those aspects of blame and 
punishment that are not effective deterrents for future wrongdoing. This conclusion also suggests 
that it is problematic to make inferences from the claim that psychopaths seem to warrant blame-
like treatment to the claim that they must be responsible for their wrongdoing. Finally, there is no 
tension in saying that the very deficits that make psychopaths prone to behavior that seems to 
warrant blame cast doubts on whether they are responsible, for the blame that is warranted is in fact 
faux-blame, and one can be faux-blameworthy without being responsible. 
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3. Responsibility Without Humanity? 
 
I will now turn to the question of whether, and to what extent, non-human animals might be 
part of the responsibility community. Though there is a large and growing body of literature about 
what responsibilities we might have to animals, there has been considerably less investigation of 
whether animals themselves are responsible to anyone for anything. Perhaps this question has 
received less attention because the capacity for responsible agency is typically conceived of as a 
property that agents possess solely in virtue of their psychological capacities (e.g., for rationality or 
self-control). It is notoriously difficult, however, to assess to what extent non-human animals are in 
possession of those capacities. Fortunately, this is not the only possible approach one is able to take 
in considering whether animals might be responsible. Considering the relationships animals have to 
us and to each other provides additional means to move discussions of animal agency forward, and 
indeed makes the notion of animals as responsible agents substantially more credible.   
a. A Familiar Impasse 
One common approach when investigating animal agency is to try to draw inferences about 
the inner lives of animals based on observations of their outward behavior. Those who believe that 
animals are moral agents as well as moral patients cite examples of animals engaging in what at least 
seem to be striking examples of empathy and altruistic behavior, both in experimental settings and in 
the wild.78 Consider the following examples from Shapiro:  
“…wolves are commonly seen to be very devoted and caring parents. Whales will place their 
bodies in between whaling ships and a harpooned whale, sometimes even capsizing the boat 
in an effort to free their fellow whale. Chimpanzees are capable of understanding when 
another chimp is dying and will take measures not only to avoid disturbing the ailing elder, 
but also to caress and otherwise comfort her. Dolphins will go to lengths to make sure that 
injured dolphins are kept afloat to prevent them from drowning. Also, in many species, 
                                                        
78 While responsibility and moral agency are not identical concepts, presumably they are overlapping 
notions.  
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when an infant is orphaned, surviving adults of the group will commonly adopt the orphan 
and raise him with as much affection as they do their biological offspring” (Shapiro 360). 
 
Though there are a variety of views that claim that animals are at least proto-moral agents, they share 
a number of similarities, among them, “the emphasis on sentiment rather than reason as the basis of 
morality, the view that there are layers and degrees of morality, [and] the view that the evolutionary 
continuities between humans and non-humans are morally significant…” (Clement 5). 
Those who are skeptical about examples like Shapiro’s express concerns about 
overinterpreting animal behavior, and neglecting the importance of rationality (that animals 
purportedly lack) to moral agency; while animals might have sentiments that guide them to behave 
well, perhaps even intentionally, without reason they are unable to do the right thing (by our lights) 
because it is right. As Clement writes, “Most allow that animals have conscious intentions—that, for 
instance, mother animals do desire to help their infants. Yet they deny that such intentions or desires 
constitute moral agency, on the grounds that they do not necessarily involve the rationality that is 
essential to morality” (Clement 2). She continues,  
“To say that a being is a moral agent is to make a claim not just about that being’s behaviors 
but also about that being’s cognitive and emotional states. The difficult question, then, 
becomes just what we are justified in inferring about animal intentions from animal behaviors 
that we observe. Critics insist that we should not attribute moral emotions to non-human 
animals if there is a plausible nonmoral explanation for animals’ apparently moral behavior” 
(Clement 6). 
 
 Without the ability to step back from their intentions and desires and rationally evaluate them, 
skeptics have argued that animals may possess some of the precursors to moral agency (as displayed 
through their behavior) but not the genuine article. 
Such skeptics likewise contend that proponents of animal moral agency are 
anthropomorphizing animal behavior.  
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“Experiments have shown that both rats and rhesus monkeys are willing to give up the 
opportunity to eat if pressing the lever for food delivers a shock to a second member of their 
species visible in an adjacent chamber. Even though some animals eventually start pressing 
the lever for food again, they do so less than when no shock is delivered to the animal next 
door. In such cases it has appeared to observers that the animal is indeed acting out of a 
moral motive such as sympathy and thus is in some sense a moral agent. However, although 
these behaviors may superficially resemble moral acts, there are plausible nonmoral 
explanations for such animal behavior. Perhaps the animals refrained from eating not out of 
sympathy for the second animal but because the shocked animal’s screaming and wriggling 
were simply unpleasant. Supporting this second possibility is the result of another 
experiment, in which rats were deterred from pressing the food bar even more by white 
noise than by recordings of rat squeals” (Clement 6-7). 
 
In many cases, it is possible to provide debunking explanations for what some have interpreted as 
animal moral agency, either as too anecdotal or as explicable in nonmoral terms. Some of these 
debunking explanations are indeed persuasive, but we should nonetheless be cautious about 
indiscriminately employing this methodology to explain away the appearance of moral behavior on 
the part of animals. After all, “we do not insist on ruling out all plausible nonmoral explanations of 
apparently moral actions to be convinced that another human being is a moral agent. Thus, the 
insistence that we rule out all plausible nonmoral explanations of apparently moral actions before we 
can know that a non-human animal is a moral agent may be the result of accepting a human–animal 
dualism as a default position” (Clement 9).  
 It seems that proponents of and skeptics about animal moral agency largely agree that 
animals are in possession of instincts and emotional capacities that may guide them to do what we 
would judge to be the right thing. Where the disagreement seems to lie is in whether those capacities 
are sufficient for moral agency, or whether additional cognitive (e.g., rational) capacities are required. 
It may be more difficult to assess whether animals possess those cognitive capacities without the 
possibility of linguistic communication with them. One has to wonder if this way of understanding 
the requirements on animal moral agency already stacks the deck against this possibility. As Darwin 
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writes, referring to a similar quagmire about animal self-consciousness, “It may be freely admitted 
that no animal is self-conscious, if by this term it is implied, that he reflects on such points, as 
whence he comes or whither he will go, or what is life and death, and so forth. But how can we feel 
sure that an old dog with an excellent memory and some power of imagination, as shewn by his 
dreams, never reflects on his past pleasures or pains in the chase?” (as cited in Cheney and Seyfarth 
199). Moreover, if skeptics insist that one must rule out all plausible nonmoral alternative 
explanations before crediting animals with moral behavior, they will likely also have an exceedingly 
high bar for establishing that animals are cognitively sophisticated enough to be moral agents. 
b. A Way Forward 
Clement argues that the debate about animal moral agency is, by any other name, the debate 
between sentimentalists and rationalists – that is, those who believe that morality is fundamentally 
grounded in emotional capacities and those who believe it is grounded in cognitive capacities. This 
debate is a familiar and longstanding one, and to attempt to do it justice would take me beyond the 
scope of my project. When questions about which psychological capacities are required for moral 
agency are applied to animals, matters become even more complicated, given additional difficulties 
in knowing about the internal lives of animals. Clement thus suggests that, “[r]ather than redoubling 
our efforts to draw inferences about the inner lives of animals based on observations of animal 
behavior or dismissing our experiences of non-human animals as moral actors…we [should] instead 
regard our relationships with animals as possible sources of insight and understanding” (Clement 
12).  
How would this work exactly? Clement herself is sketchy about the precise consequences of 
this proposal. But she suggests that moral agency is bound up with responsibility, and that we do 
already hold animals responsible – that is, on her view, we praise them for some things and blame 
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them for others. One might here object that praise and blame in these cases is purely a matter of 
training aimed at bringing about desired behavioral outcomes rather than genuine holding 
responsible. When someone praises her dog and gives him a treat for performing a trick, it may 
seem like a stretch to regard the owner as holding the dog responsible for doing what she asks.  
Surely some putative examples of praising and blaming animals are solely aimed at bringing 
about desired behavioral outcomes, but some of them do seem like genuine examples of holding 
responsible.79 Think, for example, of police officers and their trained dogs. Hearne writes, “[A good 
police dog]…can be taken to the scene of a liquor-store robbery and asked to search, with the 
handler trusting that he won’t molest the customers or other police officers or the clerk behind the 
counter. He knows what belongs and what doesn’t…” (Hearne 21-22). A police dog has a job to do, 
and duties associated with that job. Though his training might have involved being held “shallowly 
accountable” for upholding various norms at least some of the time, police dogs also learn a great 
deal about the significance of those norms in human life, and develop relationships with their 
handlers. Arguably, these relationships and the trust that is a part of them are indications that police 
officers genuinely hold their dogs responsible in the line of duty.  
Clement also provides examples of other authors, such as anthropologist Barbara Smuts and 
philosophers Raymond Gaita and Mark Rowlands, who characterize their relationships with their 
companion animals as friendships, and who “…make it clear that they regard friendship as morally 
                                                        
79 This question about whether what appears to be holding animals responsible is best described as 
training whose sole aim is behavior modification is in some ways parallel to earlier discussion of the 
pretense view of holding children responsible in Chapter 2. Though our relationships to both 
children and animals sometimes involve a sort of faux-praise and blame whose sole purpose is to 
inculcate good behavior, the insistence that this is all we are doing when we appear to hold them 
responsible depends on antecedently assuming that children and animals are not responsible agents.  
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significant…These authors do not seek to establish what can be known about the ‘inner lives’ of 
animals…as a way of justifying their interactions with animals…[Rather, they] accept and examine 
the interactions and relations that they already experience; they consider how best to describe those 
relationships and the faculties of both humans and animals that must exist to make…these 
relationships [possible]” (Clement 11).80 
One way of understanding what Clement and her fellow authors are referring to when they 
discuss their relationships with animals as friendships, involving mutual respect and reciprocity, is to 
say that these are relationships that are sources of norms. Though as far as I am aware they do not 
use this language exactly, my reasons for inferring this are two-fold: First, praise and blame 
characteristically make sense against the backdrop of norms that one is responsible for upholding. 
Second, friendships that involve mutual respect and reciprocity are ones where the friends in 
question jointly establish how they would like to be with each other through the creation of 
relationship-based norms. Provided that this is an appropriate description of at least some of our 
relationships to animals, it suggests that animals could be and be appropriately held responsible in 
much the same way I’ve suggested other agents are. In the next section, I will consider examples of 
                                                        
80 Considering our relationships to animals is also important for understanding our responsibilities to 
them, and in particular our differential responsibilities to wild and domesticated animals. Clare 
Palmer argues that this distinction is a morally important one, for, “Humans can establish certain 
relations with animals that change what is owed to them.” She continues, “…[H]umans are largely 
responsible for (a) the actual situation in which domesticated animals live, often closely confined in 
spaces that prevent them from finding food, mates, and the like independently of human provision; 
(b) key facets of domesticated animal natures, including in many cases an inability to be self-sufficient 
owing to physiological or temperamental changes; and (c) the very existence of most individual 
domesticated animals, because they are bred by humans” (Palmer 713, emphasis in original). Though 
wild and domesticated animals often share a lot of capacities thought to be relevant to moral status 
(e.g., the capacity to feel pain), by domesticating animals and thereby making them more vulnerable 
and dependent on us, Palmer contends (I think plausibly) that we accrue special obligations to them.  
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normativity in the animal kingdom, first in the context of human-animal relationships, and then in 
the relationships that animals have with each other. I will then consider what this means with respect 
to the question of whether animals are responsible, and if so, what they are responsible for.  
c. Animal Normativity 
My suggestion is that thinking about animal agency in relational terms can give us additional 
tools with which to evaluate whether animals are responsible. In this section, I will consider 
arguments about whether animals exhibit “not just regularities in their social behavior, but can be 
rightly said to follow social norms” (Musschenga 38).  
 i. Human-Animal Relationships 
 There are numerous stories about human-animal relationships in which animals uphold (or 
indeed, exceed) our expectations for them: of horses trained by the military to guide the soldiers 
atop them through mine fields, or dogs being excellent judges of character, or even a pet baboon 
helping his human compatriot repair his car.81 Our relationships with animals, particularly 
domesticated animals, have the propensity to be rich with normative content. In some ways, this is 
not especially surprising, for however deep the barriers are to linguistic communication with animals, 
many of us live alongside animals and therefore must negotiate how we want to be with each other. 
Moreover, in the case of domesticated animals like dogs, they have evolved partly to be in 
relationship with us, so it is no accident that they are (on the whole) good at knowing how to do 
                                                        
81 Lest you be incredulous about this latter example, behold: “One of our acquaintances, Wayne 
Hansen, a farmer and wildlife conservationist in Namibia, had a pet baboon, Elvis, who acted as his 
assistant car mechanic. While Wayne lay on his back under his Land Rover, Elvis would sit near the 
toolbox, handing Wayne spanners, wrenches, and fuel filters as Wayne requested them. Wayne 
reports that Elvis had difficulty distinguishing "Number 10 spanner" from "Number 12 spanner." 
This problem was easily solved by Wayne saying "No, the other spanner," whereupon Elvis would 
try again” (Cheney and Seyfarth 258). 
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that. If we accept, as I have urged, that we are responsible in some domain in virtue of being subject 
to norms in that domain, and that we can be responsible in virtue of norms that arise in our 
relationships, then we ought to conclude that at least some animals are garden-variety responsible 
agents. 
Nevertheless, given the cognitive differences between humans and animals, there are 
obstacles to creating norms that fit the agents in question. Setting aside concerns about 
anthropomorphism, we tend to make assumptions about the kinds of intelligence animals have, and 
what is appropriate to demand of them as a result. One of the most striking examples of this comes 
from the early 20th century:  
“In Germany there was once a cart horse named Hans, owned by one Herr von Osten. Hans 
had to back the cart he pulled in a circular drive, and his skill at doing this, the story goes, so 
impressed von Osten that he decided that horses in general and Hans in particular must be 
smarter than generally supposed. Von Osten began doing various things with Hans, teaching 
him to respond to questions either by tapping with a hoof a certain number of times or else 
by indicating one of a number of blocks on which the alphabet was written. Hans was a 
good learner, and in time philosophers, linguists and psychologists from all over came to test 
his acumen. It turned out that Hans could not answer questions if he could not see the 
person asking him. It turned out further that if the questioner was in sight, Hans could 
always find out what the questioner thought was the correct answer, no matter how hard the 
questioner worked at remaining still and impassive. Hans apparently read minute changes in 
breathing, angles of the eyebrows, etc., with an accuracy we have trouble imagining” (Hearne 
4). 
 
This case is often referred to in psychology to describe the “Clever Hans effect,” whereby animal 
behavior is influenced by subtle, unintentional cueing by questioners.82 Though this is a vitally 
important thing to know about when engaging in animal research, of course, it does not wholly 
                                                        
82 More worryingly, a similar effect holds of drug and bomb sniffing dogs, whereby they are 
unconsciously cued to raise alerts by their handlers’ judgments about whether an individual is guilty, 
resulting in false positives. For more on this, see Lit, et al. (2011). 
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discredit Hans’ cleverness. Rather, it suggests the cleverness is social rather than mathematical or 
linguistic. 
This is one of many cases in which the social knowledge that animals exhibit in their 
relationships with us exceed the cognitive sophistication they exhibit in other areas. Their ability to 
be receptive to language and other forms of communication, for example, may far outstrip their 
ability to perform other cognitive tasks, or to self-consciously and intentionally produce such 
communications themselves. Elvis, the baboon who had no trouble bringing tools as requested, 
nonetheless could not produce vocalizations in such a way as to refer to any of the tools in 
question.83 Vicki Hearne describes the process of training dogs as a matter of creating a shared 
vocabulary, but this is meant to be compatible with respecting the differences in what vocabulary 
means when referring to dogs versus human beings. She writes,  
“The better trained a dog is—which is to say, the greater his ‘vocabulary’—the more mutual 
trust there is, the more dog and human can rely on each other to behave responsibly. 
‘Responsible’ may seem an odd expression to use in reference to an animal, but it is the only 
term that makes sense of certain training situations… In real life, the case of competent 
police-dog trackers indicates what I have in mind. A good police dog has not only a large 
vocabulary but also extraordinary social skills. He understands many forms of human culture 
and has his being within them” (Hearne 21). 
 
She also contrasts dogs with wolves, who she is careful to say are not antisocial, despite being unable 
to be immersed in our social world in the same way that dogs are. “The wolf has wolfish social skills, 
                                                        
83 This is not to deny that baboons can perform impressive feats with their vocalizations, in terms of 
issuing alarm calls, solicitations, and grunts that respect and contribute to a complex social hierarchy. 
But Cheney and Seyfarth, who have observed and written about baboons extensively, argue that 
while these communications are voluntary and meaningful, they are nonetheless not nearly as 
flexible as human language. As they write, “The discontinuities between production and perception 
result in an oddly unbalanced form of communication: monkeys (and other animals) can learn many 
sound-meaning pairs but cannot produce new words, and they understand conceptual relations but 
cannot attach labels to them” (Cheney and Seyfarth 263). 
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but he has no human social skills, which is why we say that a wolf is a wild animal. And since human 
beings have for all practical purposes no wolfish social skills, the wolf regards the human being as a 
wild animal, and the wolf is correct. He doesn’t trust us, with perfectly good reason” (Hearne 22-23). 
 On the whole, I want to suggest, animals who are domesticated, or who otherwise have 
relationships with us, most likely have responsibilities in those relationships. Those relationships, like 
relationships between human beings, are quite variable, and consequently the norms that arise in the 
context of those relationships will vary as well. But there are additional dangers in our relationships 
with animals of overreading or underreading their abilities, social and otherwise. Think, for example, 
of the Temerlins, who attempted to raise a chimpanzee as their “child,” “who reportedly turns out 
on examination not to have learned from her family…as much about not biting and toilet training as 
the family dog,” or of “…tales of retreating armies on horseback traversing minefields, in which the 
only riders who survive are the ones who gave their horses their heads” (Hearne 23-24). Coming to 
our relationships with animals with preconceptions about their intelligence and how it relates to our 
own can be an obstacle to creating norms that make sense for the parties in question. This again 
suggests the importance of thinking about responsibility as a relational phenomenon; our 
responsibilities are something we work out with others as we navigate the social world. 
 ii. Animal-Animal Relationships 
 If at least some animals are subject to norms in their relationships with human beings, do 
animals create such norms with each other? I tentatively suggest the answer is ‘yes.’ There are a 
number of examples of at least our fellow primates engaging in what appears to be norm-driven 
behavior. I will begin by offering a few of such examples before considering what examples like 
these have been taken to indicate about animal moral agency and responsibility in the philosophical 
literature.  
   
 
 107 
 In Baboon Metaphysics, Cheney and Seyfarth argue that baboons have highly complex social 
dynamics, and are remarkably talented at navigating a shifting social world. In particular, both male 
and female baboons have variable dominance ranks (though males’ vary considerably more than 
females’), and their behavior with other baboons changes considerably relative to their place in the 
social hierarchy. For instance,  
“[i]f a female wants to handle an infant whose mother ranks lower than she does, she simply 
walks toward the mother, grunts repeatedly to appease her (low-ranking mothers are often 
very nervous and grunts seem to reduce their anxiety…) and touches or hugs the 
infant…The approaching female is not at all aggressive, but there is no hint of deference in 
her behavior. By contrast, if a female wants to handle an infant whose mother ranks higher 
than she does, the process is considerably more elaborate and obsequious. The female 
approaches the mother tentatively, grunting several times while gazing at the infant. If the 
mother does not threaten her away, the female moves closer, then sits and grunts again. If 
there is still no threat from the mother, the female inches her way to within arm's length, and 
while furiously grunting to the mother reaches out and gently touches the baby” (Cheney 
and Seyfarth, 65-6). 
 
One could easily describe this as a norm about infant-handling: the greater the difference in rank 
between an adult female and an infant’s mother, the more deference that adult must show in order 
to be allowed to handle that infant. If she does not show adequate deference, she might well be 
threatened by its mother.  
 In addition, baboons have an interesting way of resolving conflict that builds on their 
complex social networks.  
“Regardless of their dominance rank, group life is essential for all female baboons. Their 
reproductive success is determined primarily by predation and infanticide, and females can 
diminish the deleterious effects of these twin selective pressures by establishing and 
maintaining close bonds with kin, adult males, and other adult females. Reconciliation serves 
the important function of minimizing and ameliorating the disruptive effects of aggression, 
restoring tolerance among females, and maintaining group cohesion. In baboons, however, 
direct reconciliation between opponents and their victims occurs relatively infrequently, after 
only 10-13% of conflicts (Silk et al. 1996; Wittig et al. 2007a). This low frequency may arise 
in part because subordinate victims tend to steer clear of their opponents after a dispute in 
apparent fear that the attack will be renewed. Interestingly, though, a close relative of the 
aggressor may often attempt to reconcile with the victim by hugging or grunting to her soon 
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after the conflict ends…Among the Okavango baboons, kin-mediated reconciliation occurs 
roughly twice as often as direct reconciliation by the aggressor herself” (Cheney and Seyfarth 
83). 
 
It is beneficial to baboons for them to make amends, so to speak, after conflict. In the population 
Cheney and Seyfarth observed, however, family members of the parties in conflict were twice as 
likely to attempt reconciliation than the parties in the conflict themselves. This suggests that there is 
perhaps another norm here, regarding the appropriateness of kin-mediated reconciliation – say, that 
one’s relatives can act on one’s behalf in order to contribute to social cohesion. Cheney and Seyfarth 
further suggest an explanation for why relatives so often intercede following conflicts, namely that, 
“kin-mediated reconciliation may occur because baboons identify so strongly with their close 
relatives that interactions involving family members are viewed as surrogates for interactions 
involving themselves” (Cheney and Seyfarth 214). Still, they emphasize that, “Baboons choose 
whether or not to form an alliance with a relative who is already winning a dispute, and they choose 
whether or not to reconcile with an individual who has already lost a fight to their relative. They do 
not always do so; the response is not reflexive” (Cheney and Seyfarth 216). In other words, it is not 
mere instinct that drives baboons to engage in kin-mediated reconciliation. It requires some further 
judgment on the part of baboons about how they should behave given their social arrangement. 
Finally, consider this example from Kristin Andrews regarding chimpanzees. As she writes, 
“…some chimpanzee societies engage in a highly complex cooperative hunting strategy, and 
have meat-sharing rules corresponding to the individual roles performed by those in the 
hunting party (Boesch, 2002). Typically, there are four roles that the animals will take when 
hunting monkeys: driver, chaser, ambusher, and captor. When the prey is spotted, each of 
the hunters takes on one of these roles, based on their location in relation to the monkey and 
their anticipation of the monkey’s behavior. The hunters have to behave flexibly, for they 
will change roles as the situation dictates, and fall back to rely on one another if that seems 
to be the most efficient way to achieve the goal. Each of these roles is quite sophisticated, 
and it can take the chimpanzees twenty years to become proficient in the more sophisticated 
hunting roles. Once the hunt is concluded, the meat is divided up between the four hunters. 
While the age and dominance of each member of the hunting party affects the distribution 
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of meat, the most significant factor determining distribution is the degree of effort. The 
meat-sharing rules state that the largest share of the meat goes to the animal who did the 
most to catch the prey. As an implicit rule governing behavior, chimpanzee meat-sharing 
may be seen as a norm that deals with fair distribution and cooperation, and involves 
negotiating between one’s personal desire for the meat and the more impersonal value 
associated with fair distribution.” (Andrews 443-4)84 
 
As with the norms that arise in our relationships with animals, the behavior we observe 
among animals underdetermines the precise content of particular norm, and the psychological 
capacities that undergird what looks like norm-driven behavior. I have tried to suggest that we can 
recognize animals as creatures subject to normative demands in their relationships with us while 
remaining largely agnostic as to the precise nature of their internal lives. Nonetheless, some 
philosophers writing about animal moral agency and responsibility have questioned the possibility of 
being subject to norms without the capacity for theory of mind, which non-human animals are 
generally thought to lack.85 Andrews characterizes theory of mind as follows: “To have a theory of 
                                                        
84 Though Cheney and Seyfarth are somewhat skeptical about this interpretation of chimpanzee 
behavior. They write, “…when chimpanzees hunt, they do not consistently coordinate their 
respective roles, nor do they punish those who fail to share the catch. They appear to be much less 
sensitive than humans to the psychological mechanisms underlying cooperation” (Cheney and 
Seyfarth 193). 
 
85 Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that there is substantial disagreement about how to 
understand what a theory of mind is, and how to assess it using non-linguistic paradigms (which 
would be required to evaluate whether non-human animals have a theory of mind). Some 
ethologists, such as Tomasello, et al. also claim that, “the generic label ‘theory of mind’ actually 
covers a wide range of processes of social cognition…[A]lthough chimpanzees almost certainly do 
not understand other minds in the same way that humans do (e.g. they apparently do not understand 
beliefs) they do understand some psychological processes (e.g. seeing)… There is nothing odd about 
this. Human children do not understand such things as beliefs until about four years of age. But 
between one and two years of age they clearly show, in a number of different experimental 
paradigms, that they understand such psychological processes as seeing, attending, desiring and 
intending. So do two-year-olds have a theory of mind? It is not a helpful question” (Tomasello, et al. 
239). Instead of inferring from non-human animals’ poor facility with the concept of belief that they 
lack a theory of mind wholesale, these ethologists suggest that we “turn up the microscope” and 
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mind is to have the ability to attribute beliefs and desires to others, to use these mental state 
concepts for making predictions” (Andrews 433). Some have argued that having a theory of mind is 
necessary in order to be norm-sensitive; in order to regard oneself as subject to a norm, one has to 
attribute an expectation to oneself and to others that one should obey said norm. 
Andrews, however, expresses skepticism about this line of reasoning. She argues, in fact, that 
this view has things exactly backwards: “…[H]aving a theory of mind requires having at least implicit 
knowledge of the norms of the community, and…an implicit understanding of the normative is 
what drives the development of a theory of mind [evolutionarily speaking]” (Andrews 433). 
According to Andrews, the primary function of a theory of mind is to be able to explain behavior in 
terms of reasons, rather than merely predict it. The need to come up with such explanations, 
however, is parasitic on already understanding of what the norms of your society are, and when 
there are departures from such norms. She therefore suggests that what appear to be norms within 
the animal kingdom are properly understood as such, even in species without a theory of mind. 
“Indeed, individuals across species demonstrate implicit understanding of norms as demonstrated by 
responses to violations of those norms. Observational data suggests that individuals who violate 
social norms can suffer consequences such as social ostracization or attack…” (Andrews 444).86  
                                                        
investigate what precisely the psychological processes of non-human animals reveal about their 
understandings of each other (Tomasello, et al. 240). 
86 Musschenga likewise rejects the claim that a theory of mind is necessary to be able to internalize 
and act according to norms. Nonetheless, he claims that without a theory of mind, animal behavior 
at its most norm-driven is nonetheless not an exercise of moral or responsible agency; though 
animals can internalize norms, they have no conscious awareness of those norms as such, and 
therefore their behavior is best understood as analogous to habitual human behavior. He then argues 
that human beings are responsible for their habitual behavior only because they have the capacity to 
deliberately intervene on such behavior, which animals lack. Musschenga’s view of responsibility is 
derived from Fischer and Ravizza’s reasons-responsiveness view, and it would take me too far afield 
to respond in detail to his view. But it is worth mentioning that even those who think animals are 
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Just as in the case of our relationships with animals, it is difficult to know the precise nature 
of the norms to which animals seem to hold each other. It is also possible that there are alternative 
explanations for what looks, from the outside, like norm-driven behavior, though we should not 
rush to assume that these explanations are more plausible than the claim that animals create and 
enforce norms. If animals are to be responsible to each other on my view, they must have the 
following abilities: 1) to be able to understand that there are individuals other than themselves 2) 
who have expectations of them such that if they violate those expectations, they will be regarded as 
having done something wrong 3) for reasons that are grounded in their relationship or membership 
in a larger community. I take myself to have shown that there is some evidence that non-human 
animals possess these abilities, though it is far from decisive. 
4.  Conclusion 
I have considered here the boundaries of the responsibility community, and argued that our 
ability to be responsible is bounded by our ability to be in community with others. I have suggested, 
therefore, that at least some non-human animals are more likely to be responsible agents than 
psychopaths are. This is because these animals exhibit a susceptibility to be sensitive to the 
normative demands of others, and not merely insofar as the exercise of that sensitivity is 
instrumentally advantageous for them. If this is correct, then it suggests that the capacity for 
responsible agency is more closely connected to the ability to know and be concerned with what 
others are feeling than what they are thinking, for psychopaths possess the cognitive empathy and 
theory of mind that non-human animals are generally thought to lack.  
                                                        
sensitive to norms, display empathy, and so on, can deny that animals are moral or responsible 
agents if their view of those forms of agency is a rationalist one. 
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My conclusions here have overall been tentative, however, because there are significant 
limits to our current empirical understanding of both psychopaths and non-human animals. In the 
case of psychopaths, the studies that have been done so far have had small sample sizes and have 
generally been conducted in institutional settings, which are unlikely to be representative of the 
population of psychopaths as a whole. In the case of non-human animals, it is easy for us to 
overinterpret or underinterpret their behavior, as their cognitive lives are substantially different from 
our own. In suggesting that at least some non-human animals are responsible agents, I do not wish 
to minimize those differences, which may indeed be reflected in which norms those animals are 
responsible for upholding. I have argued, with Strawson, that responsibility should be understood as 
a social practice, and “[o]ur practices do not merely exploit our natures, they express them” 
(Strawson 27). We care about responsibility as social creatures, for the sake of being with others. 
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